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RETHINKING DIVERSITY AND PROXIES FOR ECONOMIC DISADVANTAGE IN 
HIGHER EDUCATION: 
A FIRST GENERATION STUDENTS‘ PROJECT 
 
Tomiko Brown-Nagin* 
(forthcoming Univ. Chi. Legal Forum, Fall 2014) 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
On the fiftieth anniversary of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, this 
Article argues for a renewed focus on disadvantage and social mobility in 
higher education law and policy. When President Lyndon Johnson urged 
passage of the Civil Rights Act and originally advocated affirmative 
action, the goals of rooting out discrimination and ensuring social 
mobility for all Americans motivated him. Over time, these goals receded 
in law and policy. Courts justified affirmative action on grounds of 
diversity. More recently, commentators urged consideration of ―class- 
based‖ affirmative action or advocated policies that  favor ―low-income‖ 
students.  Both initiatives can help open up access to selective 
institutions of higher education. However, neither is a dependable proxy 
for disadvantage in education. Race-based affirmative action justified on 
grounds of diversity is a vital tool for ameliorating racial inequality, but 
it does not necessarily address class-based disadvantage. Class- or 
income-based policies do not necessarily benefit the neediest students. 
The demographic makeup of selective institutions of higher 
education today suggests that neither effort is particularly effective in 
ensuring social mobility. Campuses are more racially heterogeneous, but 
largely economically homogenous. If the social mobility objectives of the 
Civil Rights Act are to be more fully realized, universities must 
supplement current admissions and aid policies. 
Today‘s costly, ultra-competitive, and strategically managed 
admissions environment makes it even more vital to create pathways for 
talented students from truly disadvantaged backgrounds to selective 
institutions. To avoid the crowding out of the neediest students, 
disadvantage must be identified more precisely and attacked at its roots 
instead of indirectly. Favorable treatment of first-generation, Pell 
Grant-eligible students in three areas—admissions, financial aid, and 
institutional outreach—can facilitate greater access for truly 
educationally disadvantaged students. Through initiatives focused on 
these students, colleges can simultaneously tackle social problems 
related to income, socio-culture, place, and race, advance equal 
educational opportunity and pursue the national interest in social 
mobility. 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This Article argues for a renewed focus on disadvantage and 
social mobility in higher education law and policy. The fiftieth 
anniversaries of the Civil Rights Act (CRA) and the Economic 
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 2   
Opportunity Act (EOA), the centerpiece of the War on Poverty, provide 
the occasion for the argument. Five decades ago, President Johnson 
urged passage of the CRA, followed by the EOA, and advocated 
affirmative action to root out discrimination and ensure social mobility 
for Americans disadvantaged by race and social class. 
 
By 1971, when the US Supreme Court decided Bakke v 
California, the origins and aims of the CRA had receded in legal thought, 
and its relationship to the EOA, the landmark antipoverty statute, had 
been lost. Affirmative action justified on diversity grounds detached 
access to higher education from questions about group-based 
disadvantage. Instead of focusing on group-based harm, diversity-based 
reasoning asked how individual student‘s traits or characteristics might 
be educationally advantageous. 
 
To be sure, diversity-based affirmative action has proved 
beneficial to some of the CRA‘s intended beneficiaries. It opened up 
selective universities to certain groups of deserving students of color— 
particularly black and multiracial immigrants, Hispanics, and biracial 
students, especially those from more affluent and well-educated 
backgrounds. This is a welcome development. The racial integration of 
elite institutions serves compelling purposes. It creates wealth and social 
capital in communities of color and solidifies their  still tenuous place in 
the American middle class. 
 
However, affirmative action, as now practiced by selective 
universities, also has left deserving students behind. The interests of 
students of color from more disadvantaged communities—inspirations 
for the landmark civil rights laws—have lost ground in the current legal 
regime. The limited conception of equality in legal thought today reflects 
a closing opportunity structure in higher education for disadvantaged 
students of all races. Costs are high and admission is ultra-competitive; 
officials practice strategic enrollment management in which the fiscal 
implications of admissions and financial aid decisions affect access. In 
this environment, talented but impoverished students can fall through 
the cracks if universities do not make a conscious effort to reach them. 
 
The furious legal debate over affirmative action tends to crowd 
out conversation about the overall direction of higher education and 
policy and how educational disadvantage fits within it. Following the 
lead of the Supreme Court, scholars have argued for decade after decade 
about racial classifications and their status under the Constitution. The 
formalism inherent in such discussions pushes structural inequality in 3   
society1 and in higher education2 to the background or completely out of 
view. 
This Article intervenes in the literature not with another 
perspective for or against affirmative action, but by shifting the 
conversation to new and, I hope, more fertile ground. It foregrounds a 
group of students seldom discussed in legal scholarship: talented yet 
truly disadvantaged students of all racial and ethnic backgrounds. The 
article focuses, in particular, on first-generation college students. For the 
first time, these collegians, who comprise up to thirty percent of 
students, receive sustained treatment in the law review literature.3 
Moreover, the article discusses higher education from the inside out, 
delving deep into policy matters, rather than outside in, the approach 
understandably taken in much of legal scholarship. Methodologically, 
the article traverses the fields of history, sociology, and psychology and 
joins insights from these fields to constitutional and education law. 
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This Article‘s overall contribution lies at the intersection of law 
and policy. It suggests a path of return and recommitment to the 
national commitment to social mobility originally embraced by the CRA, 
the EOA, and early iterations of affirmative action. Going forward, 
policymakers should prioritize affordable access to selective colleges by 
students in underserved and disadvantaged communities nationwide, 
regardless of racial background. Favorable treatment of first-generation, 
Pell Grant-eligible status in three areas—admissions, financial aid, and 
institutional outreach—can facilitate this policy goal. Through initiatives 
focused on this group, colleges can simultaneously tackle social problems 
related to income, race, and place, advance equal educational 
opportunity, and pursue the national interest in social mobility. 
 
This Article unfolds as follows. Parts I through III provide context 
for the policy interventions made in Parts IV and V. These initial parts 
offer accounts of history and constitutional law that explore the theme of 
departure; these parts explain the drift in law and policy away from the 
original purposes of the landmark Civil Rights Act. Part I describes the 
trio of super statutes, including the Civil Rights Act, which created a 
new social order in America. This part emphasizes that the laws did not 
merely ban discrimination but also aspired to facilitate social mobility. 
Parts II and III identify doctrinal developments that eroded the civil 
rights laws‘ social mobility impact in education. Part II focuses on 
enforcement of Title VI by the Executive Branch and the federal courts. 
Part III  examines how the Supreme Court‘s turn to ―diversity‖ as a 
justification for affirmative action helped to sever these policies from a 
necessary concern for disadvantage. 
 
The Article‘s higher education reform arguments unfold in Parts 
IV and V. These parts make policy arguments and compromise the 
Article‘s main contribution to the literature on access and opportunity in 
higher education. Part IV discusses the opportunity structure in higher 
education today; it considers factors internal and external to colleges and 
universities that impede access for truly impoverished students. Part V 
offers a new way of thinking about access to selective higher education 
for disadvantaged students. This Part argues for special consideration 
for first-generation, Pell-Grant-eligible students in admissions, financial 
aid, and institutional outreach. It explains how targeting needy, first- 
generation students can advance social mobility. 
 
I.  AN ORIGIN STORY: THE CORRECTIVE JUSTICE AND SOCIAL MOBILITY 
IMPERATIVES OF THE CRA, THE EOA, AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
 
This Part offers an account of the origins of the Civil Rights Act 
(CRA). It emphasizes the CRA‘s twin purposes of antidiscrimination and 
social mobility. 
 
A.  Civil Rights-Era Super Statutes 5   
The Civil Rights Act, along with the Economic Opportunity Act, 
and the Voting Rights Act, rightly are understood as  ―super statutes.‖4 
With the enactment of these laws, Congress transformed American law 
and society, inscribing a new legal and social contract.5 
 
In the wake of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, 
President Lyndon Johnson spearheaded the passage of the CRA, the 
omnibus antidiscrimination law. Congress enacted the legislation in July 
of 1964, following cataclysmic violence in the South6 and the civil rights 
movement‘s demands for ―Jobs and Freedom‖ during the  March on 
Washington.7 
 
Just one month later, Congress passed the Economic Opportunity 
Act (EOA),8 the central legislative component of President Johnson‘s 
―War on Poverty.‖9 The EOA expanded the reach and fulfilled the 
promise of the CRA.10 The CRA had banned discrimination, but did not 
address the disproportionate poverty caused by slavery and Jim Crow or 
the effects of discrimination in the labor market and in education.11 Dr. 
 
 
4 These public norm—and institution—changing laws  are  ―super- 
statues.‖ See William N. Eskridge Jr and John A. Ferejohn,   Super- 
Statutes, 50 Duke L J 1215, 1276 (2001). 
5 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides: ―No person in the 
United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be 
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected 
to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal 
financial assistance.‖ 42 USC  § 2000d. Agencies promulgate rules to 
enforce the statute and may withhold federal funds to accomplish its 
objectives. 
6 See Glenn Eskew, But for Birmingham: The Local and National 
Movements in the Civil Rights Struggle 299, 310–12 (University of North 
Carolina 1997). 
7 See Thomas F. Jackson, From Civil Rights to Human Rights: Martin 
Luther King, Jr., and the Struggle for Economic Justice 171–87 
(Pennsylvania 2007). 
8 42 USC § 2711 et seq. 
9 See Nick Kotz, Judgment Days: Lyndon Baines Johnson, Martin Luther 
King Jr., and the Laws That Changed America 182–84 (Houghton Mifflin 
2005); Robert F. Clark, The War on Poverty: History, Selected Programs 
and Ongoing Impact 1 (America 2002). 
10 See 42 USC § 2711 et seq; Kotz, Judgment Days at 182–84 (cited in 
note 9); Clark The War on Poverty at 4–5 (cited in note 9). 
11 See generally The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub L No 88-352, 78 Stat 
241, codified at 42 USC § 151 et seq. On labor market discrimination, see 
Nancy MacLean, Freedom is Not Enough: The Opening of the American 
Workplace 55 (Harvard 2006); Risa L. Goluboff, The Lost Promise of 
Civil Rights (Harvard 2007); Michael Honey, Black Workers Remember: 6 
Martin Luther King Jr. eloquently described why Congress needed to   
 
supplement the antidiscrimination law with new programs. ―Even if the 
Civil Rights Act ended all discrimination,‖ he said, ―Black poverty, ‗the 
historic and institutionalized consequences of color,‘ would  continue.‖12 
By championing the EOA, President Johnson partially answered 
activists‘ call  for corrective justice—remedying past discrimination and 
its present effects13—and their particular demand for attention to black 
joblessness.14 The  EOA‘s job training programs and job corps, its legal 
services and social welfare programs, layered on top of the CRA, began to 
do the work of preparing working-class and poor black Americans to join 
the mainstream of American life.15 
 
Political power came next. Congress enacted the Voting Rights 
Act (VRA), which banned racial discrimination in the electoral process, 
in August of 1965, following the violent Selma to Montgomery March.16 
The political rights conferred by the VRA further advanced the goal of 
opening up American society, already begun by the CRA and EOA. 
 
B.  Affirmative Action as a Tool of Social Mobility in the Workplace 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An Oral History of Segregation, Unionism, and the Freedom Struggle 
(University of California 1999). On educational discrimination, see 
James D. Anderson, The Education of Blacks in the South, 1860–1935 1– 
3, 79–237 (University of North Carolina 1988); Adam Fairclough, A Class 
of Their Own: Black Teachers in the Segregated South 4, 9, 10, 108–09, 
116, 131, 190, 367–68 (Harvard 2007). 
12 See Jackson, From Civil Rights to Human Rights at 204 (cited in note 
7). 
13 On corrective justice, see Paul Gewirtz, Choice in the Transition: 
School Desegregation and the Corrective Ideal, 86 Colum L Rev 728, 
731–36 (1986)  (exploring ―corrective aspiration‖ in the  context of the 
Reagan Administration school desegregation policy and stating that 
corrective justice ―requires significant measures to eliminate the  ongoing 
effects of discrimination; it requires remedial intervention that goes 
beyond the prohibitions of the antidiscrimination principle itself, since 
merely assuring prospective adherence to that principle will not undo 
continuing effects  of past violations‖). 
14 See Clark, The War on Poverty at 7, 25–26 (cited in note 9). 
15 See id. Of course not all African-Americans were poor; some had 
attained middle-class and professional status. See, for example, Tomiko 
Brown-Nagin, Courage to Dissent: Atlanta and the Long History of the 
Civil Rights Movement 31–33 (Oxford 2011); E. Franklin Frazier, Black 
Bourgeoisie (Free 1st ed 1997). 
16 See Jackson, The Education of Blacks at 219–23 (cited in note). 7 
Affirmative action, as originally conceived, complemented the   
 
CRA, EOA, and VRA in aim and effect.17 In the spring of 1965, a month 
after the Senate passed the VRA,18 President Johnson began touting the 
set of ideas that spawned affirmative action policies. In a June 1965 
address on the campus of Howard University, President Johnson called 
for the  ―next and the more profound stage in the battle for civil rights.‖19 
That new stage required government employers to take special steps to 
create real opportunity for blacks in the workplace.20  ―[I]t is not enough 
just to open the gates of opportunity,‖ Johnson explained. ―All our 
citizens must have the  ability to walk through those gates.‖21 Affirmative 
action would close the gap between the principles of formal equality— 
now enshrined in the signature civil rights, economic opportunity, and 
voting rights laws—and tangible opportunity.22 
 
Upward social mobility animated the design of these first 
affirmative action policies: ideally, members of the working class would 
ascend into the middle class as a result of the opportunities opened up by 
the law.23 Workers without college degrees benefited tremendously from 
efforts to end racial discrimination in industrial sectors, often union 
shops.24 At the urging of civil rights lawyers and activists,25 the Johnson 
 
 
 
 
17 President John F. Kennedy first implemented Executive Order 1114 
requiring ―affirmative action‖ after protests in Philadelphia about racial 
discrimination in the construction industry. See Matthew Countryman, 
Up South: Civil Rights and Black Power in Philadelphia 123 (University 
of Pennsylvania 2007). 
18 The VRA was introduced in March 1965, passed by the Senate on May 
26, 1965, passed by the House on July 9, 1965, and signed into law by 
the President on August 6, 1965. See Gary May, Bending Toward 
Justice: The Voting Rights Act and the Transformation of American 
Democracy 165–68 (Basic Books 2013). 
19   See Lyndon B. Johnson, To Fulfill These Rights, in John Hope 
Franklin and Isidore Starr, eds, The Negro in Twentieth Century 
America: A Reader on the Struggle for Civil Rights 225, 226 (Random 
House 1967). 
20 See John W. Johnson and Robert P. Green Jr, Affirmative Action 43 
(Greenwood 2009). 
21 See Johnson, To Fulfill These Rights at 226 (cited in note 19). 
22 See Kotz, Judgment Days at 334 (cited in note 9); Johnson and Green, 
Affirmative Action at 43 (cited in note 20). 
23 On social mobility, see Christopher Phelan, Opportunity and Social 
Mobility, 73 Rev of Econ Studies 487,504 (2006). 
24 See Paul Frymer, Black and Blue: African Americans, the Labor 
Movement, and the Decline of the Democratic Party 1–3, 70–71 
(Princeton 2008) (discussing the growth in black membership in unions 
during the 1970s as a result of federal government intervention and civil 8 
 
 
administration implemented affirmative action policies that compelled 
federal contractors in the building trades and the auto and steel 
industries, among others, to end the wholesale exclusion of black workers 
from the workplace, and thus, from the American middle class.26 
 
The Nixon administration initially buttressed the Johnson 
administration‘s affirmative action efforts by imposing specific 
timetables and goals for compliance in the building trades. 27 Although 
President Nixon‘s  commitment to affirmative action did not last,28 the 
complexion of the American workforce changed by the mid-1970s.29 The 
combined efforts of Executive Branch agencies, civil rights lawyers and 
activists, and the U.S. Supreme Court, which, for a time, expansively 
interpreted the Civil Rights Act,30 propelled changed. Industries adopted 
 
 
 
 
rights litigation). See also William H. Harris, The Harder We Run: Black 
Workers Since the Civil War 45–47, 156–57 (Oxford 1982). 
25 Civil rights activists staged protests to secure jobs on worksites before 
passage of the Civil Rights Act. See Rubio, History of Affirmative Action 
at 152 (cited in note) (noting the claim that between 1959 and 1963 
protests in Philadelphia opened 2,000 jobs to blacks workers). See also 
MacLean, Freedom is Not Enough at 42, 54–55, 57 (cited in note). On the 
Philadelphia protests, see Countryman, Up South at 123, 147–48, 283, 
329 (cited in note 17). 
26 See David Hamilton Golland, Constructing Affirmative Action: the 
Struggle for Equal Employment Opportunity 79, 103–04, 114 (Kentucky 
2011).  The  Labor Department‘s Office of Federal Contract Compliance, 
established by the Johnson administration in 1965, took the lead in 
efforts to implement affirmative action. 
27 See Rubio, History of Affirmative Action at 154–55 (cited in note 26). 
See also Frymer, Black and Blue at 37–38 (cited in note 24). 
28 See Frymer, Black and Blue at 37–38 (cited in note 24). 
29 See id at 68–89. 
30 See Griggs v Duke Power, 401 US 424, 436 (1971) (holding that job 
requirements unrelated to successful performance that 
disproportionately disadvantaged one race could establish a violation of 
CRA). On various presidents‘ views  about how widely  the   Griggs 
standard applied, see Brian K. Landsberg, Enforcing Civil Rights: Race 
Discrimination and the Department of Justice 134–35 (Kansas 1997). 
The Court also advanced the project of workplace integration by 
declining to hear a challenge to a lower court decision affirming the 
Philadelphia Plan, and implemented pursuant to Title VI of the CRA, 
which required all applicants for federal contracts to pledge support for 
nondiscrimination and affirmation action employment practices. See 
Golland, Constructing Affirmative Action at 131, 158 (cited in note 26), 
citing  Contractors‘  As s ociation  of  Eastern  Penns ylvania v  Secr 
etary  of    Labor, 442 F2d 159 (3d Cir 1971). The Supreme Court denied a 
Petition 9 
 
 
affirmative action hiring policies as a consequence of CRA lawsuits, the 
threat of such suits, and after administrative enforcement actions.31 For 
the first time in American history, black workers gained appreciable 
access to traditionally white occupations.32 Latinos, other racial and 
ethnic minority groups, and women also entered occupations from which 
they had been excluded on the strength of the CRA‘s antidiscrimination 
provisions.33 The small numbers of black Americans already in the 
middle class experienced even greater strides.34 
 
C.  Affirmative Action as a Tool of Social Mobility in Education 
 
In the realm of education, a similar pattern ensued. Demands for 
inclusion in higher education arose during protests for racial equality— 
including on college campuses35—and after the passage of the landmark 
civil rights laws. The Office of Civil Rights of the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare (HEW), later the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) of 
the Department of Education, relied on Title VI of the Civil Rights Act to 
desegregate education in the South.36 Secondary schools and institutions 
of higher education opened to black students as a result of the authority 
granted the Executive Branch to withhold funds for noncompliance with 
the statute‘s antidiscrimination principles.37 
 
 
for Certiorari on the matter. See generally Contractors Assoc of Eastern 
Pa v Hodgson, 404 US 854 (1971). 
31 See Frymer, Black and Blue at 70–71 (cited in note 24). See also 
Harris, The Harder We Run at 159–60 (cited in note 24). For a 
description of the tools used to enforce the CRA, see Landsberg, 
Enforcing Civil Rights at 14–15 (cited in note 30). 
32 See Frymer, Black and Blue at 1, 70–72 (cited in note 24); 
Countryman, Up South at 123 (cited in note 17). 
33 See MacLean, at   (cited in note 11) ;  See Serena Mayeri, Reasoning 
from Race: Feminism, Law and the Civil Rights Revolution (2011). 
34 See Hugh Davis Graham, The Origins of Affirmative Action: Civil 
Rights and the Regulatory State, 523 Annals of Am AcadPol & Soc Sci 
50, 61 (1992). 
35 On the role of protests on college campuses, see generally Martha 
Biondi, The Black Revolution on Campus (University of California 2012). 
36 See Landsberg, Enforcing Civil Rights at 123, 142–44 (cited in note 
30). 
37 See Gavin Wright, Sharing the Prize: The Economics of the Civil 
Rights Revolution in the American South 156–58 (Belknap 2013) 
(discussing the role of federal funds as an incentive to school districts to 
desegregate). See also Lia Epperson, Undercover Power: Examining the 
Role of the Executive Branch in Determining the Meaning and Scope of 
School Integration Jurisprudence, 10 Berkeley J African-Am L & Pol 
146, 146–49 (2008); Chinh Q. Le, Racially Integrated Education and the 
Role of the Federal Government, 88 NC L Rev 725, 731–47 (2010). 10 
 
 
 
As a result of the federal government‘s power  to enforce Title  VI 
of the Civil Rights Act, black students who hailed from families that 
previously had been excluded from higher education gained a foothold in 
numerous colleges and universities, mostly in formerly segregated 
southern and border states. OCR developed affirmative action programs 
that resulted in the recruitment and retention of students of color across 
these regions during the 1970s and 1980s.38 Adams v Richardson,39 a 
successful suit to force a reluctant Nixon administration to enforce the 
Act, proved a catalyst for change.40 Following Adams, colleges and 
universities in Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, 
Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Virginia 
developed plans to ensure access and equity.41 Litigation under Title VI 
also increased funding and programming at historically black 
institutions during the 1980s and 1990s.42 
 
These early affirmative action efforts in education, like the initial 
efforts in employment, partly served the goal of social mobility. Whites 
who hailed from upper-class households had long leveraged their social 
status for special consideration in the admissions process at selective 
institutions.43 Now the civil rights laws allowed black students— 
including the most disadvantaged ones—to enjoy the American ideal of 
achieving success through higher education. 
 
The historic and demographic context ensured that the most 
disadvantaged students benefited from early affirmative action policies.44 
 
 
38 See Landsberg, CITE CORRECTLY (cited in note 31). 
39 356 F Supp 92 (DDC 1972). 
40 Adams v Richardson, 356 F Supp at 100, affd 480 F2d 1159 (DC Cir 
1973) (en banc) (per curiam). 
41 See Epperson, 10 Berkeley J African-Am L & Pol at 158–61 (cited in 
note 37). 
42 See, for example, United States v Fordice, 505 US 717, 717 (1992); 
Ayers v Fordice, 879 F Supp 1419, 1434 (ND Miss 1995), affd in part, 
revd in part 111 F3d 1183 (5th Cir 1997); Knight v Alabama, 787 F Supp 
1030, 1396 (ND Ala 1991), affd in part, revd in part, vacd in part 14 F3d 
1534 (11th Cir 1994); Geier v Alexander, 801 F2d 799, 810 (6th Cir 
1986); Geier v University of Tennessee, 597 F2d 1056, 1071 (6th Cir 
1979); United States v Louisiana, 811 F Supp 1151, 1173 (ED La 1992); 
Knight v Alabama, 900 F Supp 272, 385 (ND Ala 1995). 
43 See, for example, Jerome Karabel, The Chosen: The Hidden History of 
Admission and Exclusion at Harvard, Yale, and Princeton 13–14, 25, 39– 
76 (Houghton Mifflin 2005). 
44 See Colin S. Diver, From Equality to Diversity: The Detour from 
Brown to Grutter, 2004 U Ill L Rev 691, 694–96 (2004) (describing the 
remedial goals of early affirmative action programs); Kevin Brown and 11 
 
 
In 1971, the overwhelming majority of blacks who matriculated to college 
entered as first-generation college students: 62.9 percent of black 
freshman were first-generation college students (as compared to 38.5 
percent of freshman overall).45 In that same year, an even larger share of 
Hispanics, 69.6 percent, were first-generation college students.46 With 
the advent of laws mandating equal access, these students attended 
selective colleges and universities in appreciable numbers for the very 
first time.47 The new collegians not only altered the aesthetic of higher 
education, but also successfully sought changes to campus culture, 
curriculum, and personnel.48 Like the American workplace, the college 
campus shed its monochromatic hue for a multiracial identity during the 
1970s. 
 
II. THE DEPARTURE: 
THE DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AND 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AS TOOLS OF SOCIAL MOBILITY THROUGH 
EDUCATION 
 
Part II, which focuses exclusively on the educational context, 
explores the theme of departure. During the era of successful federal 
implementation of the Civil Rights Act (CRA) in education, the three 
branches of government worked synergistically to secure access of 
students of color to higher education. This part enumerates and analyzes 
 
 
 
 
Jeannine Bell, Demise of the Talented Tenth: Affirmative Action and the 
Increasing Underrepresentation of Ascendant Blacks at Selective Higher 
Educational Institutions, 69 Ohio St L J 1229, 1230 (2008) (arguing that 
at the  time early affirmative action programs were  enacted, ―the 
overwhelming majority of blacks who were of college age . . . were 
descendants of blacks originally brought to the United States as chattel 
slaves‖). See  also  William Bowen and Derek Bok, The Shape of the River: 
Long-Term Consequences of Considering Race in College and University 
Admissions 7 (Princeton 1998) (discussing how during late 1960s and 
early 1970s   ―many colleges place[d] an emphasis on recruiting truly 
disadvantaged students from  ghettos‖). 
45 See Victor B. Saenz, et al, First in my Family: A Profile of First- 
Generation College Students at Four-Year Institutions Since 1971 *10 
(Cooperative Institutional Research Program May 2007), online at 
http://www.heri.ucla.edu/PDFs/pubs/TFS/Special/Monographs/FirstInMy 
Family.pdf (visited Feb 7, 2014). (noting forty-four percent of Native 
Americans and 42 percent of Asian American freshmen were first- 
generation students). 
46 See id. 
47 See Bowen and Bok, The Shape of the River at 7–8 (cited in note 44). 
48 See Biondi, The Black Revolution on Campus at 115–17 (cited in note 
35). 12 
 
 
three factors that, over time, reduced the effectiveness and limited the 
reach of the CRA as a tool of social mobility. 
 
These factors include variable enforcement of the CRA by 
executive branch agencies, narrow judicial interpretations of the CRA‘s‘s 
scope, and the cordoning off of a corrective justice theory of constitutional 
remediation to a narrow category of cases relating to historically black 
colleges. 
 
A.  Variable Enforcement. 
 
The roots of dilemmas that eventually overwhelmed efforts to 
promote social mobility for students of color through Executive Branch 
enforcement of the CRA emerged soon after the  law‘s passage. The 
Executive himself turned out to be the primary impediment to the 
success of such efforts. Enforcement ebbed and flowed depending on the 
identity and party of the President. Presidents Richard Nixon, Ronald 
Reagan, George W. Bush, and George H.W. Bush reduced Title VI 
investigation and enforcement efforts designed to integrate both 
elementary and secondary schools and universities.49 In the absence of 
Executive Branch enforcement efforts, it fell to private plaintiffs to 
enforce the statute. 
 
B. Narrow judicial interpretation. 
 
The federal courts, after playing a significant role in support of 
Executive Branch enforcement action,50 later issued decisions that 
 
 
 
49 See Landsberg, Enforcing Civil Rights at 102, 120, 147, 168, 169, 181 
(cited in note 30) (discussing the  Reagan DOJ‘s express decisions to 
deemphasize school desegregation and affirmative action as enforcement 
priorities); id at 104–13 (discussing the priority given to civil rights 
enforcement in education, voting rights, and other areas during the 
Johnson administration); Epperson, 10 Berkeley J African-Am L & Pol at 
160 (cited in note 37) (describing ―precipitous[]‖ decrease in Title VI 
enforcement under the Bush I administration); Le, 88 NC L Rev at 748 
(cited in note 37) (noting that Bush II was  criticized for ―aggressively 
oppos[ing]‖ school  desegregation efforts); William L. Taylor, et al, 
Declining Civil Rights Enforcement Under the Bush Administration *6 
(Center for American Progress 2007), online at 
http://www.americanprogress.org/wp- 
content/uploads/issues/2007/03/pdf/civil_rights_report.pdf (visited Feb 7, 
2014).  The  Nixon  administration‘s reluctance to compel  compliance with 
Title VI inspired plaintiffs to sue the federal government; the subsequent 
suit resulted in a landmark civil rights action that heralded substantial 
change in higher education. See Adams, 356 F Supp at 93–94. 
50 See cases cited supra notes 46, 48. 13 
 
 
limited the scope of the CRA. The most significant recent cases relate to 
the ability of private parties to enforce Title VI of the CRA. In 2001, the 
U.S. Supreme Court held that no private right of action exists to enforce 
Title VI on a disparate impact theory of liability.51 Private plaintiffs can 
only sue for violations of intentional discrimination under Title VI, 
claims that are exceedingly difficult to prove.52 These interpretations of 
the law, in effect, consigned Title VI enforcement to the Executive 
Branch; OCR can investigate citizen complaints alleging disparate 
impact discrimination and take enforcement action where warranted.53 
In theory, this result is not averse to the interests of complainants. 
 
In practice, enforcement by private parties, as well as by the 
Executive Branch, has been  vital to citizens‘ ability to secure civil rights. 
History and experience show that multi-branch enforcement, including 
―private attorney generals,‖ is a superior enforcement model.54 For, as 
explained,55 political considerations often influence whether 
administrations are willing to wield the discretion to robustly enforce the 
law. On those occasions when plausible cases exist but the will to enforce 
the  law  does  not, citizens‘ civil rights are entangled in a Gordian knot. 
 
C. HBCs and Corrective Justice. 
 
A third limitation on the Civil Rights Act relates to the doctrinal 
treatment of historically black colleges (HBCs). Students who attend 
HBCs—disproportionately from first-generation, low-income 
households56—are precisely the kinds of individuals whom Congress 
 
51 See Alexander v Sandoval, 532 US 275, 285 (2001). 
52 See, for example, Washington v Davis, 426 US 229, 239–40 (1976) 
(holding that  police department‘s employment test which excluded four 
times as many black applicants as white applicants did not demonstrate 
intentional discrimination). See also Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the 
Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan 
L Rev 317, 319 (1987). 
53 The  Department of Education‘s Office of Civil Rights retains the 
authority to investigate complaints alleging disparate impact. See 
Kimberly West-Faulcon, The River Runs Dry: When Title VI Trumps 
State Anti-Affirmative Action Laws, 157 U Pa L Rev 1075, 1123–24 
(2009). Moreover, as Justice Stevens asserted in Sandoval, plaintiffs still 
may be able to assert a Title VI disparate impact theory by way of 42 
USC § 1983. See Sandoval, 532 US at 300 (Stevens dissenting). 
54 See Landsberg, Enforcing Civil Rights (cited in note 30). 
55 See note 49. 
 
56 See Marybeth Gasman, The Changing Face of Historically Black 
Colleges and Universities 10 (Center for Minority Serving Institutions 
2013)  (arguing that  ―the majority, but certainly not all, of HBCU 
students are low-income, first-generation, and Pell-Grant-eligible"), 14 
 
 
sought to aid with the passage of Title VI. These students figured 
prominently into the constitutional and policy conversation about access 
to selective higher education in the decade after the CRA‘s passage, in 
cases such as Adams v Richardson and its progeny.57 
 
Litigation over inclusion of these students in higher education is 
ongoing. Federal courts have intervened on a theory of corrective 
justice,58 found significant constitutional violations, and ordered 
substantial changes to place black colleges on a more equal footing with 
historically white ones in recent years.59 
 
However, the doctrine on HBCs is more or less irrelevant to the 
rest of higher education law. More specifically, the law on HBCs is 
separate and distinct from the doctrine on access to selective institutions 
of higher education.60 The two-track approach is counterproductive to the 
interests of students affected by discrimination. It precludes 
constitutional law from coming to terms with the full weight of the 
nation‘s history of discrimination in higher education, including at 
selective institutions that are untethered to HBCs but were historically 
and remain overwhelmingly white. Two cases illustrate the point. 
 
1.  United States v Fordice (1992). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
citing Charmaine Jackson Mercer and James B. Stedman, Minority- 
Serving Institutions: Selected Institutional and Student Characteristics, 
28–54 in Understanding Minority-Serving Institutions (State University 
of New York 2008) (Marybeth Gasman, Benjamin Baez, and Caroline 
Sotello Viernes Turner, eds). 
57 See generally Mercer and Stedman, Minority-Serving Institutions 
(cited in note _). 
58 This same theory had animated passage of the Civil Rights Act and 
robust federal intervention in the workplace and public education has 
given rise to federal intervention in this area. See Parts I and II. 
59 See Gewirtz, 86 Colum L Rev at 731–36 (cited in note 13). 
60 No historically black colleges appear on Barron‘s list of selective 
colleges. See Rankings by Selectivity (NY Times Apr 4, 2013), online at 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/04/04/business/economy/econo 
mix-selectivity-table.html (visited Feb 7, 2014). The US News and World 
Report, which also ranks colleges, publishes a separate list of historically 
black colleges. The institutions are compared only to each other. See 
Historically Black Colleges and Universities Ranking (US News and 
World Report 2014), online at 
http://colleges.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best- 
colleges/rankings/hbcu (visited Feb 7, 2014). 15 
 
 
United States v Fordice61 is the leading higher education case that 
shows the limited utility of corrective justice as a conceptual framework 
in modern equality cases that do not pertain to HBCs.62 In Fordice, the 
Supreme Court held that Mississippi had not met its constitutional 
obligations under the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI to remedy the 
effects of its former dual school system by merely adopting race-neutral 
policies.63 Historically black and white colleges remained racially 
identifiable, and the policies in effect perpetuated a racially identifiable 
college system and influenced black and white students‘ college choices.64  
Admissions requirements, institutional classification, programming, and 
funding policies all contributed to the dual track system.65 The Court 
remanded the case with instructions to the Fifth Circuit to consider 
whether the maintenance of eight institutions of higher education, 
including three historically black colleges, might itself perpetuate 
discrimination.66 
 
Subsequently, the Fifth Circuit upheld expansive remedial orders 
that required funding increases and programming changes for the college 
system (for example, uniform admissions standards, summer study, and 
retention initiatives), but preserved the two-track, racially separate 
university system.67 
 
This approach seldom is questioned. Many commentators hold the 
view that historically black colleges serve an important role in the higher 
education ecosystem.68 The institutions are  ―educationally justifiable.‖69 
Therefore, black colleges should be preserved, advocates argue, even if 
the institutions undeniably are relics of Jim Crow.70 
 
 
 
 
 
61 505 US 717 (1992). 
62 See id at 743. 
63 See Fordice, 505 US at 732–43. 
64 See id at 734–35. 
65 See id at 738–43. 
66 See id at 719–20 (change pin cite). 
67 See Ayers v Fordice, 111 F3d 1183, 1228 (5th Cir 1997). 
68 See Fisher v University of Texas at Austin, 133 S Ct 2411, 2432 n 5 
(2013) (Thomas dissenting); Grutter v Bollinger, 539 US 306, 364–66 
(2003) (Thomas dissenting). 
69 See Fordice, 505 US at 742. 
70 See, for example, Alfreda A. Sellers Diamond, Black, White, Brown, 
Green, and   Fordice: The Flavor of Higher Education in Louisiana and 
Mississippi, 5 Hastings Race & Poverty L J 57, 106–07 (2008) (arguing 
that under Fordice a  ―truly progressive and effective desegregation plan . 
. .  should account[] for the successes the historically black institutions 
experienced despite the  disparities in funding they lacked‖). 16 
 
 
The problem with this doctrinal approach—presumably an 
unintended consequence—is that it removes historically disadvantaged 
communities, the discrimination they experienced, and its continuing 
impact from the analysis in the broader constitutional conversation 
about equity in higher education.71 Most notably, it removes these 
subjects from the decision-making calculus in cases about race-conscious 
affirmative action, as I shall explain below.72 
 
2.    Wooden v Board of Regents (1999). 
 
The practical consequences of the two-track approach are 
profound. Plaintiffs who allege reverse discrimination under the Civil 
Rights Act and the Equal Protection Clause routinely leverage the 
rhetoric of colorblindness acontextually.73 They explicitly or implicitly 
rely on the history of pervasive race-based discrimination against African 
Americans to support admissions policies that disproportionately exclude 
African Americans and other students of color from campus. 
 
Consider, as an example of this phenomenon, the result in 
Wooden v Board of Regents,74 a challenge to the  University of Georgia‘s 
(UGA) affirmative action policy.75 White plaintiffs alleged that UGA‘s 
admissions program, which included a race-conscious element that 
benefitted underrepresented minorities, violated the rights of whites 
under the Constitution and Title VI; blacks with lower scores and grades 
had allegedly displaced whites with higher scores and grades.76 In hopes 
of vindicating UGA‘s affirmative action program, the  NAACP  turned to 
Georgia‘s history of discrimination and its present effects on black 
applicants and matriculates to the university.77 UGA‘s history of 
exclusion and discrimination against blacks undermined blacks‘ 
preparation for and even interest in the university, the NAACP argued, 
and justified special admissions and recruitment programs.78 The 
 
 
71 The  Court‘s jurisprudence considers past discrimination and diversity 
rationales for affirmative action as distinct. See notes 67–69 and 
accompanying text. See also Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social 
Movements, and the Law: The Case of Affirmative Action, 105 Colum L 
Rev 1436, 1478–85 (2005). 
72 See notes 40–41 and accompanying text. 
73 See, for example, Grutter, 539 US,at 341 (discussing the law school‘s 
emphasis on admitting a critical mass of underrepresented minority 
students). 
74 Wooden v Board of Regents of University System of Georgia, 32 F Supp 
2d 1370 (SD Ga 1999). 
75 See id at 1372. 
76 See id at 1382–84. 
77 See id at 1383. 
78 See Wooden, 32 F Supp 2d at 1382–84. 17 
 
 
District Court curtly rejected the claim that UGA‘s history of 
discrimination mattered, at least in the manner contemplated by the 
NAACP, stating ―[e]ven if true, the fact that many black high school 
students choose, for some reason, not to apply to or attend UGA is not a 
reason for enacting a racially discriminatory admission policy. All such a 
statistic would show is black student disinterest for, or bias against, 
UGA.‖79  The  NAACP‘s argument had backfired. If discrimination was 
afoot, this judge concluded, white students and historically white 
institutions—not blacks—had suffered.80 
 
Georgia‘s historically black college system influenced the judge‘s 
point of view. Black students, he pointed out, attend Georgia‘s HBCs at a 
high rate.81 These students‘ attraction to HBCs explained their relative 
absence from UGA; by the court‘s  logic, they freely and overwhelmingly 
choose the  state‘s HBCs over the University of Georgia—the  state‘s 
flagship institution and a nationally-ranked selective institution.82 The 
court ultimately dismissed claims related to the impact of the HBCs on 
the university system as a whole on grounds that these ―analytically 
distinct‖ claims must be addressed separately.83 
 
Wooden is just one of many suits in which judges pointedly and 
colorfully expressed the view that historic discrimination against 
underrepresented students of color and any ongoing effects on society are 
 
 
79 See id at 1382 (emphasis added). 
80 The Court also opined: 
Such disinterest and antipathy, the NAACP no doubt would 
argue, derives from UGA's history of past segregation. That 
cannot carry the  day.  ―[M]ere knowledge of [and thus, minority 
group reaction to] a historical fact is not the kind of present effect 
that can justify a race exclusive remedy. If it were otherwise, as 
long as there are people who have access to history books, there 
will be programs such  as this.‖ 
Id at 1383, citing Podberesky v Kirwan, 38 F3d 147, 154 (4th Cir 1994). 
81 See Wooden, 32 F Supp 2d at 1382–84. 
82 See Most Selective Colleges List (Georgetown University 2009), online 
at http://cew.georgetown.edu/separateandunequal/selective-colleges 
(visited Feb 7, 2014), citing Rankings by Selectivity (NY Times Apr 4, 
2013), online at 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/04/04/business/economy/econo 
mix-selectivity-table.html?_r=0 (visited Feb 7, 2014). 
83 See Wooden, 32 F Supp 2d at 1372, vacd Tracy v Board of Regents of 
the University System, 208 F3d  1313  (11th Cir 2000).  ―The Court held 
that the HBI challengers lacked standing to pursue their claims because 
they suffered no ‗injury in fact‘ and asserted only  a  ‗generalized 
grievance.‘‖ See  Tracy v Board of Regents of University System of 
Georgia, 2000 WL 1521555 (SD Ga July 24, 2000) (citation omitted). 18 
 
 
unavailing—except to support ―colorblind‖ policies. Most famously, Chief 
Justice Roberts, in Parents Involved in Community Schools v Settle 
School District,84 held that the  country‘s history of racial exclusion of 
blacks from public schools required the Court to void a voluntary policy 
of racial inclusion in the Louisville and Seattle public schools.85  ―History 
will be heard,‖ Roberts said, in his ruling that racial classifications— 
here, school assignment policies that deprived white students of their 
first choice of school—presumptively violate the Constitution.86 
 
The  Chief  Justice‘s reasoning about race  in   Parents Involved in 
2007 reads much like the understanding of equality that became 
ascendant in the Supreme Court‘s higher education jurisprudence during 
the 1970s, as the next part explains.87 
 
Part III. 
Limitations on Affirmative Action as a Tool of Social Mobility in 
Higher Education 
 
This Part again explores the theme of departure, this time in the 
context of the  Supreme Court‘s jurisprudence in affirmative action cases. 
It argues that the Court‘s embrace of the  rhetoric of diversity, as opposed 
to corrective justice, for these policies had a variety of consequences, both 
positive and negative. The capacious rhetoric confers tremendous 
discretion on universities; under the rubric of ―diversity,‖ officials  can 
choose to admit an array of worthy students and avoid explicit reasoning 
about race. That outcome is politically beneficial in the American 
context, where powerbrokers often avoid conversations about race.88 
Other benefits may flow from diversity-based reasoning that this part 
does not rehearse. 
 
This part instead focuses on one particular disadvantage of the 
diversity-based justification for affirmative action as it is discussed by 
the Supreme Court and implemented by selective universities. Diversity- 
based reasoning disconnects affirmative action policies from an explicit 
conversation about disadvantage. Consequently, the outreach to truly 
disadvantaged students that characterized both early affirmative action 
 
 
84 551 US 701 (2007). 
85 See Parents Involved, 551 US at 720–25. See also Ricci, 557 US at 584. 
86 Parents Involved, 551 US at 746. 
87 For  a strongly critical take on Robert‘s opinion, see Charles Lawrence 
III, Unconscious Racism Revisited: Reflections on Impact and Origins of 
the Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection, 40 Conn L Rev 931, 934–35 (2008). 
88 For commentary, see Ta-Neisha Coates, The Conversation on Race, 
The Atlantic, July 27, 2010; A.O. Scott, Never Ending Story: 
Conversation on Race Has Not Brought Cultural Consensus, NY Times, 
Sept. 27, 2013. 19 
 
 
efforts and numerous civil rights-era laws over time fell away. Students 
from better-educated, wealthier homes now benefit disproportionately 
from affirmative action. It is a welcome development that those students 
have established a presence at selective institutions of higher education. 
However, the crowding out of disadvantage in conversations about 
opportunity in higher education is an undesirable development. 
 
A.  Bakke v California (1978): from corrective justice and social 
mobility to  ―diversity.‖ 
 
Some will be surprised that the Supreme Court‘s decision in 
Bakke v California,89 lately considered a landmark advancing equity in 
higher education, here is cited as a factor in the declining attention paid 
to the inclusion of poorer students, as a class, in higher education. 
Nevertheless, in my view, the  Court‘s decision narrowly upholding 
affirmative action policies, and on diversity grounds, constituted a short- 
term victory, but a long-term set back, to social mobility.90 
 
The diversity concept derives from Justice Powell‘s opinion, which 
over time became the controlling authority on how admissions officials 
can take race into account. The pursuit of diversity rested on a 
university‘s First Amendment rights. Powell explained that the  ―freedom 
of a university to make its own judgments as to education includes the 
selection of its student body.‖91  Universities could consider race a  ―plus‖ 
factor—one characteristic among other aspects of an applicant‘s profile 
that might be deemed vital to assembling a heterogeneous student 
population.92 Institutions could seek to attain educational diversity so 
long as all candidates competed in a single admissions pool and officials 
did not resort to a quota-based selection system.93 
 
Justice Powell‘s theory of diversity turned on racial universalism 
rather than group-based theories of racial difference. The racially- 
neutral text of the Constitution compelled this universalist approach, as 
Powell saw it.  The Civil  Rights Act‘s antidiscrimination principle, 
derived from the Fourteenth Amendment,94 must be applied in a 
 
 
89 Regents of Univ of California v Bakke, 438 US 265, 315 (1978) 
(―Bakke‖). 
90 See id at 315. 
91 Id at 312. 
92 Id at 314–17. 
93 The  Court also  cited  ―exceptional personal talents, unique work  or 
service experience, leadership potential, maturity, demonstrated 
compassion, a history of overcoming disadvantage, [and] ability to 
communicate with the poor‖ as relevant ―diversity‖ factors.  See Bakke, 
438 US at 317. 
94 See Bakke, 438 US at 290–92. 20 
 
 
colorblind fashion because the Constitution contained colorblind 
language.95 Neither the Equal Protection Clause nor the Civil Rights Act 
supported a theory of equality in which blacks‘ history (of racial 
subjugation) or whites‘ history (of racial domination) mattered. 
 
Powell  viewed his  capacious concept of ―diversity‖ as an 
appropriate and practical response to polyglot America.96 He claimed 
that the  ―United States had become  a Nation of minorities‖ composed of 
many ethnic, racial and religious, each of which has struggled to 
―overcome‖ ―prejudices.‖97  Under his rubric, blacks descended from 
enslaved Americans had no special claim of entitlement to judicial 
deference or admissions preference.98 Nor could any other racial or ethnic 
group claim special disadvantage under Powell‘s iteration of diversity.99 
 
In  Powell‘s  formulation, the recruitment of ―diverse‖ students 
could  involve a consideration of race  only to the  extent that the  student‘s 
racial background, or his  ―ethnic, geographic,   culturally advantaged or 
disadvantaged‖ background, contributed to the ―robust exchange of 
ideas‖ vital to advancing the mission of a university.100 Powell explicitly 
endorsed the Harvard College program, which had long included 
attention to factors such as geography or special talents.101 Powell‘s 
description of how an admissions program of the variety that he found 
constitutionally permissible would work made clear that neither race nor 
disadvantage need carry any outcome determinative weight.102 
 
 
95 See id at 293. 
96  ―[T]he white ‗majority‘ itself is composed of various minority groups, 
most of which can lay claim to a history of prior discrimination at the 
hands of the State and private individuals.‖ See  id at 295.  The judiciary 
was not equipped to  engage in the comparative weighing of claims of 
entitlement to remedial preferences. 
See id at 296–97. 
97 Id. at 292. 
98 Id at 292 (―Although many of the Framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment conceived of its primary function as bridging the vast 
distance between members of the Negro race and the white ‗majority,‘… 
the Amendment itself was framed in universal terms, without reference 
to color, ethnic origin, or condition of prior servitude‖). 
99  ―The diversity that furthers a compelling state interest encompasses a 
far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or 
ethnic origin is but a single though important element. Petitioner's 
special admissions program, focused solely on ethnic diversity, would 
hinder rather than further attainment of genuine diversity.‖ 
See Bakke, 438 US at 315 (emphasis in the original). 
100 See id at 313 (emphasis added). 
101 See id at 316. 
102 See Bakke, 438 US at 313–16. 21 
 
 
 
The file of a particular black applicant may be examined for his 
potential contribution to diversity without the factor of race being 
decisive when compared, for example, with that of an applicant 
identified as an Italian-American if the latter is thought to exhibit 
qualities more likely to promote beneficial educational pluralism. 
Such qualities could include exceptional personal talents, unique 
work or service experience, leadership potential, maturity, 
demonstrated compassion, a history of overcoming disadvantage, 
ability to communicate with the poor, or other qualifications 
deemed important. In short, an admissions program operated in 
this way is flexible enough to consider all pertinent elements of 
diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each applicant, 
and to place them on the same footing for consideration, although 
not necessarily according them the same weight. Indeed, the 
weight attributed to a particular quality may vary from year to 
year depending upon  the ―mix‖ both of the  student body and the 
applicants for the incoming class.103 
 
In  Powell‘s  understanding—the conception of affirmative action that 
became entrenched in doctrine and policy—affirmative action had no 
fixed relationship to discrimination or disadvantage.104 It might; or it 
might not. Universities would decide what diversity meant in practice. 
 
1.   Contemporary criticism of the diversity rationale. 
 
During recent debates over the constitutionality of affirmative 
action, Bakke‘s diversity-based justification of race-conscious admissions 
received high praise, and its architect, Justice Powell, won plaudits as a 
 
 
 
 
 
103 See id at 317. 
104 As a NY Times reporter explained, ―Associate Justice Lewis  F. Powell 
Jr . . . made it clear that special preference for blacks was not what the 
majority had in mind when it said race could be considered in an 
admissions policy.‖ See John Herbers,   A Plateau for Minorities: Most 
College Programs Expected to Continue, But Ruling is Seen as Brake on 
Rights Efforts, NY Times A1 (June 29, 1978). Ironically, the notion of 
recruiting students on the basis of ―disadvantage,‖ including ―racial 
disadvantage,‖ represented a consensus viewpoint. The  paper noted that 
Richard Cohen, an associate executive director of the American Jewish 
Congress, opposed race as  a selection criterion, but supported ―programs 
to speed the entry of disadvantaged racial minorities into higher 
education.‖ See Paul Delaney,   US Brief to Support Minority Admissions: 
Bell to Act in Supreme Court on California College Quota Issue, NY 
Times A1, A12 (Aug 24, 1977). 22 
 
 
judicial ―statesman.‖105  When the Justices decided Bakke, however, a 
host  of commentators critiqued Powell‘s  opinion as conceptually 
limited.106 Some argued that the opinion‘s preference for reasoning in 
terms of an individual‘s contributions to educational ―diversity,‖ rather 
than about remedying status-based discrimination and disadvantage, 
derived less from law than from politics.107 
 
Criticism of Powell‘s  approach began on the Court. In a concurring 
and dissenting opinion, Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and 
Blackmun disputed Powell‘s  claim that Title VI rested on a colorblind, 
universalist premise.108 The Justices examined the history of Title VI of 
the Civil Rights Act and administrative regulations interpreting it and 
argued that Powell‘s  ―colorblind‖ reading of the  law‘s remedial reach 
made little historical sense.109 Congress had induced compliance with the 
Act by encouraging recipients of federal funds to implement race-
conscious, affirmative action programs limited to blacks, Hispanics, and 
other under-represented minorities.110 Moreover, executive agencies 
enacted regulations that required recipients of federal funds, including 
educational institutions, to use race-conscious action to 
 
 
 
 
105  See Linda Greenhouse, Bell Hails D ecis ion:  Calls  Ruling  a  ‗Great  
 G ain‘ —Plaintif f  Is  ‗Pleas ed‘  and  O thers  Express Relief    , NY Times 
A1 (June 29, 1978). See also Paul R. Baier, Of   Bakke's Balance, Gratz 
and Grutter: The Voice of Justice Powell, 78 Tulane L Rev 1955, 1964 
(2004); 
John C. Jeffries Jr, Bakke Revisited, 55 Sup Ct Rev 1, 18–25 (2003). 
106 See Vincent Blasi, Bakke As Precedent: Does Mr. Justice Powell Have 
a Theory?, 67 Cal Law Review 21, 21(1979)(questioning validity of 
Powell‘s  conclusion that  race-based  classifications can be used to 
encourage academic dialogue but not to counteract distributive injustices 
of past centuries); Robert M. O‘Neil,  Bakke in Balance: Some 
Preliminary Thoughts, 67 Cal. L. Rev. 143, 147 (1979). For more recent 
criticisms, see generally Charles Lawrence, Two Views of the River: A 
Critique of the Liberal Defense of Affirmative Action, 101 Columbia L 
Rev 2001; Gabriel Chin, Bakke to the Wall: The Crisis of Bakkean 
Diversity, 4 Wm & Mary Bill Rts J 881 (1996). 
107 See John C. Jeffries Jr, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 470–73 
(Macmillian 1994). 
108 Bakke, 438 US at 325–421 (Brennan concurring and dissenting in 
part). 
109 See id (Brennan concurring and dissenting in part). 
110 ―It clearly desired to encourage all remedies, including the use of race, 
necessary to eliminate racial discrimination in violation of the 
Constitution rather than requiring the recipient to await a 
judicial adjudication of unconstitutionality and the judicial imposition of 
a racially oriented remedy.‖ Id at 337 (Brennan concurring and 
dissenting in part). 23 
 
 
overcome the effects of discrimination.111 Consequently, Title VI could 
support race-conscious programs designed to redress ―discrimination‖ 
even in the absence of express findings against an institution, such as 
the University of California, that implemented a policy.112 
 
Furthermore, in the  view  of these justices, the nation‘s history 
revealed fundamental differences in the experiences of the under- 
represented minorities eligible for the university set-aside program and 
of whites.113 The beneficiaries of the programs had been chosen because 
they had been targets of rank discrimination.114 Employers and 
universities made special efforts to attract blacks because the forms of 
discrimination perpetrated against blacks had been different in kind and 
more recent in our national experience than that experienced by white 
ethnics.115 Employers and school districts had completely excluded blacks 
from certain employment sectors and schools, as we have seen.116 The 
black experience of discrimination had been totalizing and pervasive. 
Whites had not been subject to discriminatory treatment on that scale.117 
Where pervasive discrimination had contributed to present patterns of 
racial disadvantage, Justice Marshall, along with Justices Brennan, 
White, and Blackmun asserted, institutions could take race into account 
to ameliorate disparate racial impact.118 Justice Blackmun pithily 
summed up this perspective: ―In order to get  beyond racism, we must 
first take account of race.‖119 
 
 
111 Id at 343–44 (Brennan concurring and dissenting in part). 
112 Bakke, 438 US at 336 (Brennan concurring and dissenting in part), 
citing 42 USC § 2000d–1 (stating that no funds shall be terminated 
unless and until it has been  ―determined that compliance cannot be 
secured by voluntary means‖). 
113 See Bakke, 438 US at 357 (Brennan concurring and dissenting in 
part). 
114 Id at 357–58 (Brennan concurring and dissenting in part). 
115 See notes 19–22 and accompanying text. 
116 See  notes 11-13 and accompanying text. 
117 Therefore, whites should not be considered ―insular minorities‖ whose 
claims of unfair treatment merited special judicial concern. Bakke, 438 
US at 288. Consideration of race to correct racial discrimination should 
be subjected to intermediate scrutiny. See id at 359 (Brennan concurring 
and dissenting in part). 
118 Id at 369 (Brennan concurring and dissenting in part). 
119 Id at 407 (Marshall concurring). In a separate opinion, Justice 
Thurgood Marshall recounted the  uniquely insidious history of ―the 
Negro‘s‖ experience in America, founded on chattel slavery, a harm 
unknown to any other group, followed by slave codes, Black Codes, laws 
of segregation, and discrimination. Id at 387–94 (Marshall concurring). 
―The position of the  Negro  today in America is the tragic but inevitable 
consequence of centuries of unequal treatment. Measured by any 24 
 
 
 
Outside of the Court, among proponents of the affirmative action, 
Bakke‘s restrained endorsement of race consciousness also fell flat. 
Powell‘s  opinion represented a  ―plateau‖ for affirmative action and a 
―brake‖ on efforts begun during the 1960s to bring blacks from the 
margins to the center of American life, some claimed. 120 After all, Powell 
had analogized the difference that race  might make in  a student‘s profile 
to being a high school quarterback.121 That modality of reasoning sorely 
misunderstood how race can shape a life and opportunity. However, 
Powell‘s  insistence that admissions officials  treat race just the  same as 
any other characteristic reflected the ethos of 1970s—an era of racial 
retrenchment.122 
 
2.   Universities as agenda-setters and decision-makers. 
 
 
 
 
 
benchmark of comfort or achievement, meaningful equality remains a 
distant dream for the  Negro.‖ Id at 395 (Marshall concurring). 
120 See Herbers, A Plateau for Minorities, NY Times at A1 (cited in note 
104). 
121 Some  admissions officials  even  interpreted Powell‘s  endorsement of 
multifactor, race-conscious review in admissions as a mandate to cease 
any  policies and programs that  could  be viewed as  ―favoring‖ racial 
minorities. See Steven V. Roberts, Professional Schools Read Mixed 
Signs in Bakke Decision, NY Times A23 (Feb 14, 1979). 
122 During the 1970s, large majorities of whites continued to oppose 
efforts to integrate elementary and secondary schools and housing, 
sometimes violently. Just as blacks gained formal political power, whites 
fled urban centers en masse, depriving black leaders who had gained 
access to municipal government the tax base and political partnerships 
needed to make government work. New Right politicians stoked racial 
resentment using crime and welfare as rallying cries. They championed 
free markets as an antidote to the social malaise reportedly caused by 
the excesses of the 1960s and liberalism. On these developments, see 
Matthew D. Lassiter, The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in the 
Sunbelt South at 227, 273–74 (Princeton University Press 2007); Joseph 
Crespino,  Strom  Thurmond‘s  Americ a  204–05, 220–21, 244–45, 253–
54 (Hill and Wang 2012); J. Anthony Lukas, Common Ground: A 
Turbulent 
Decade In the Lives of Three American Families 214, 241 257–58, 307, 
455–56 532 (Knopf 1986); Daniel T. Rodgers, Age of Fracture 131 
(Belknap 2011). Moreover, lawsuits filed by white male plaintiffs who 
alleged ―reverse discrimination‖ when employers and universities hired 
or accepted people of color and women flooded the courts. See Steven V. 
Roberts, White Males Challenge Affirmative Action Programs: More 
White Males Are Challenging Affirmative Action Programs, NY Times 
A1 (Nov 24, 1977). 25 
 
 
Proponents concerned about the fate of affirmative action after 
Bakke need not to have feared the end of efforts to include students of 
color in higher education. The choices for higher education officials going 
forward did not begin and end with the obvious ones: inclusion or 
exclusion. The key issue for the future concerned how universities would 
exercise discretion in the admissions process. Henceforth, many selective 
universities would include racial minorities in the course of seeking the 
―right mix‖  of students.123 Officials at thousands of institutions 
nationwide would answer the question of whether racial minorities who 
might need a finger on the admissions scale received extra 
consideration—and which of those racial minorities received a boost.124 
 
As universities exercised discretion and dynamics in American 
higher education changed, affirmative action changed. The extent to 
which universities made the admission of students of color a priority 
varied over time. The calculus varied annually in relation to universities‘ 
changing agendas, as shaped and reconfigured by endowments, strategic 
plans, rankings, personnel shifts, and  alumni preferences.125 The 
identity of the beneficiaries changed over time as the pools of applicants 
became more competitive, particularly at the most selective 
institutions.126 The shifting nature of affirmative action is lost in debates 
over the policies. 
 
B. Grutter v Bollinger (2003): diversity and competing interests. 
 
A close look at Justice O‘Connor‘s  majority opinion in Grutter v 
Bollinger127 reveals the  tension between higher education‘s interests in 
 
 
 
123 See Landsberg, Enforcing Civil Rights at 122–23 (cited in note 30). 
124 See Edward B. Fiske, Schools Seek Right Mix, NY Times A1 (June 30, 
1971)  (describing Harvard College‘s  current interest in physical science 
majors, engineers, and a hockey goalie;  Wesleyan University‘s search for 
the right balance of pre-professional students;  and  Dartmouth‘s interest 
in athletes and legacies). See also Landsberg, Enforcing Civil Rights at 
120 (cited in note 30) (noting that  ―preference for some categories, such 
as alumni, is universal among private colleges‖). 
125 See Scott Andrew Schulz and Jerome A. Lucido, Enrollment 
Management, Inc.: External Influences on Our Practice 5 (USC Center 
for Enrollment Research, Policy, and Practice Jan 2011), online at 
http://cerpp.usc.edu/files/2013/11/EnrollmentManagementInc.ReportFIN 
AL_001.pdf (visited Feb  7, 2014)  (arguing that admissions officers‘ 
decisions are increasingly influenced by institutional goals). 
126 See Bowen and Bok supra note      at 7-9 (discussing transition from 
recruitment of disadvantaged blacks pre-Bakke to recruitment of black 
students more capable of competing with well-qualified white, Asian and 
Hispanic applicants). 
127 539 US 306 (2003). 26 
 
 
affirmative action and a focus on social mobility, as mediated by Bakke‘s 
diversity discourse.128 The majority held that states have a compelling 
interest in pursuing the educational benefits of diverse student bodies.129 
Admissions officials may consider an applicant‘s race so long as it is just 
one factor in a holistic admissions process.130 
 
The Court‘s opinion reflected the  themes that emerged in the  course 
of the vigorous defense of its affirmative action policy that the University 
of Michigan waged.131 The school justified its programs in terms of its 
imperative to train socially literate citizens and workers. 132 In other 
words, diverse learning environments help to build savvier participants 
in the global workforce. These obligations dovetailed with the interests 
expressed by Fortune 500 employers, military officers, and government 
officials, who supported the  university‘s defense with a flood of amicus 
briefs.133 
 
Michigan argued that a ―pool problem‖ forced it to consider race as 
it sought to assemble a class of students that could advance these 
objectives.134 Because of the limited number of students of color who 
posted competitive test scores and grades, the university found it 
necessary to consider race as a factor in its holistic admissions process.135 
Only by considering race and accepting candidates deep in the applicant 
pool could the university assemble a critical mass, or sizeable number, of 
diverse students.136 
 
The  university‘s justificatory rhetoric only obliquely touched the 
theme of fundamental fairness that President Johnson and the social 
movements of the 1960s cited in defense of affirmative action.137 In fact, 
it expressly disavowed disadvantage and discrimination as rationales for 
its policies when civil rights activists pressed those arguments.138 
 
 
128 See Grutter, 539 US at 327–33. 
129 See id at 328. 
130 See id at 334. 
131 See Brown-Nagin, 105 Colum L Rev at 1453 (cited in note 71). 
132 See id. 
133 See id at 1463–65. 
134 See id at 1454 
135 See Brown-Nagin, 105 Colum L Rev at 1454 (cited in note 71). 
136 See id. 
137 Id at 1484–85.  The majority wrote that the  ―path to leadership must 
be visibly open to talented and qualified individuals of every race and 
ethnicity‖ if leaders are  to have ―legitimacy in the eyes  of the citizenry.‖ 
And it acknowledged that race still matters. Grutter, 539 US at 332–33. 
138 See Brown-Nagin, 105 Colum L Rev at 1453 (cited in note 71). A 
group of interveners did make arguments premised on historic and 
present discrimination and disadvantage. The interveners instead 27 
 
 
 
Justice  O‘Connor followed the university‘s lead.139 She 
acknowledged that  race  ―still matters‖ in society.140 But she curtly 
dismissed complaints from Justice Thomas, amici, and interveners141 that 
universities‘ own admissions criteria cause the ―selectivity‖ problem that 
they then seek to ameliorate with racial classifications.142 Justice 
O'Connor simply ―deferred to the  law school's judgment about how best 
to assemble student bodies.‖143 
 
Diversity-based reasoning, tethered to a university‘s academic 
freedom, compelled an outcome that would be interrogated if the Court 
reasoned about access to selective higher education from a corrective 
justice standpoint.144 The outcome might also be different if the Court 
included more robust  reasoning about status-based discrimination in its 
diversity reasoning.145 
 
C. Fisher v Texas (2013): latest signals about diversity and social 
mobility. 
 
If Grutter offered a less than compelling explanation for 
affirmative action, the  Court‘s decision last term in  Fisher v Texas146 
pushes the doctrine in a different direction altogether. Merely a decade 
after Justice  O‘Connor sought to ensure the long-term viability of 
affirmative action in education,147 Fisher jeopardizes those practices. 
 
 
claimed that Michigan‘s own choice  to rely  on admissions criteria known 
to favor wealthier, white students as a proxy for ―selectivity‖ compelled 
the university to consider race in admissions. Race-conscious admissions 
merely corrected for known difficulties in predicting the academic 
performance of students of color. See Brown-Nagin, 105 Colum L Rev at 
1454-58 (cited in note 71). 
139 See Grutter, 539 US at 348–49. 
140 Grutter, 539 US at 332–33. 
141 See Brown-Nagin, 105 Colum L Rev at 1454-58, 1462 (cited in note 
71). 
142  ―[P]ublic universities in states with anti-affirmative action laws are 
under intense pressure to use admissions criteria that improve their 
prestige ranking and financial bond rating.‖ See West-Faulcon, 157 U Pa 
L Rev at 1080 (cited in note 53). See also Bowen and Bok, The Shape of 
the River at 19–23 (cited in note 44). 
143 See Brown-Nagin, 105 Colum L Rev at 1484 (cited in note 71). 
144 See Fordice at 734–35 (discussing admissions requirements). 
145 I have argued that a remedial argument can supplement a diversity- 
based argument. See note 207. 
146 Fisher v University of Texas at Austin, 133 S Ct 2411 (2012). 
147 The majority opinion included a 25-year affirmative action sunset 
provision. See Grutter, 539 US at 343. 28 
 
 
 
1.   Downsizing diversity 
 
Fisher did not dramatically change doctrine, but nevertheless 
signaled a shift in the  Court‘s orientation toward race-conscious 
admissions in higher education (just as it has expressed disfavor of 
voluntary K–12 school desegregation148 and of employers‘ preemptive 
efforts to comply  with the Civil  Rights Act‘s ban  on employment 
discrimination).149 
 
In Fisher, for the first time, the Court—including Justices 
Sotomayor and Breyer, Democratic appointees thought to lean left on 
race-related issues—made clear that universities must surmount a 
substantial evidentiary burden before turning to race-conscious 
admissions policies.150 Strict scrutiny requires universities to show and 
federal courts to determine that no workable race-neutral alternative to 
race-conscious policies would produce the educational benefits of 
diversity.151 Prior cases had merely required universities to engage in 
―good faith consideration of‖ race-neutral alternatives.152 
 
The new stress on race-neutral alternatives surely is meant to 
nudge universities away from the explicit consideration of race in 
admissions. Instead of defending race-specific policies, some universities 
can be expected to respond to Fisher by embracing proxies that can yield 
racial diversity.153 Lawsuits challenging affirmative action policies, likely 
to proliferate in  Fis  her‘s  wake, may accelerate the transition away from 
explicitly race-conscious admissions. 
 
2.   Distinguishing diversity from disadvantage 
 
Fisher also is important for what it suggested about the distance 
between diversity-based affirmative action plans and the national 
interest in social mobility. For purposes of this article, this aspect of the 
 
 
148 Parents Involved in Community School v Seattle School District No 1, 
551 US 701, 747–48 (2007)(striking down school assignment policy 
designed to ensure racially diverse schools). 
149 Ricci, 557 US at 563 (2009). 
150 Fisher, 133 S Ct at 2420–22. 
151 See id at 2420. 
152 Compare Fisher, 133 S Ct at 2420, with Grutter, 539 US at 339. 
153 See Devon W. Carbado and Cheryl I. Harris, The New Racial 
Preferences, 96 Cal L Rev 1139,  1148  (2008)  (noting that an  applicant‘s 
life experience is often inextricably intertwined with their race). Within 
this changing legal context, courts may scrutinize the concept of race- 
neutrality in unexpected ways. See generally Michelle Adams, Is 
Integration a Discriminatory Purpose?, 96 Iowa L Rev 837 (2011). 29 
 
 
case is most vital. The oral arguments in Fisher reveal how far removed 
the constitutional frameworks for analyzing affirmative action are from a 
conversation about the most disadvantaged students. 
 
Fisher involved a race-sensitive policy so subtly executed that its 
impact on admissions rates could barely be measured. Only 33  of more 
than 6,000 students may have gained admission after officials at the 
University of Texas (UT) considered race.154 The overwhelmingly 
majority of blacks and Hispanics admitted to UT, like the overwhelming 
majority of whites, gained entry through an automatic admission policy 
for Texas residents who graduate at the top of their high school classes 
(the Top Ten Percent Program).155 The Top Ten Percent Program, the 
pathway for admissions for 85 percent of students during the year in 
question, is facially race neutral.156 
 
These statistics raised a question. If the Top Ten Percent 
Program had increased UT‘s percentage of students of color, particularly 
Latinos, why had the university gone to the trouble of layering a race- 
conscious policy on top of it? It turned out that the thirty-three students 
for whom race may have been a factor in admissions differed from the 
students admitted through the percentage program in a significant way. 
The thirty-three—so-called ―bridge‖ minorities—could be counted on to 
counter stereotypes and make positive contributions at UT. Here is how 
UT‘s counsel explained the  special contributions of these students: 
 
[T]he minorities who are admitted [under 10% plan] tend to come 
from segregated, racially-identifiable schools. . . . [T]aking the top 
10 percent of a racially identifiable high school may get you 
diversity that looks okay on paper, but it doesn‘t guarantee you 
diversity that produces educational benefits on campus. And 
that‘s one of the considerations that the  university took into 
account as well. . . . [T]he minority candidate who has . . . 
succeeded in an integrated environment, has shown leadership, 
community service . . . is precisely the  kind of candidate that‘s 
going to . .  . help break down racial barriers.157 
 
Justice Kennedy and others decoded the counsel‘s statement and 
made the implied connection between segregated schools, class 
 
 
154 See Brief for Petitioner, Bert W. Rein, et al, Fisher v University of 
Texas at Austin, Civil Action No 11-345, *9–10 (US filed May 21, 2012). 
155 See id. 
156 See Fisher, 133 S Ct at 2416. 
157 Transcript of Oral Argument, Fisher v University of Texas at Austin, 
Civil Action No 11-345, *41–43 (Oct 10, 2012), online at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/11- 
345.pdf (visited Feb 7, 2014). 30 
 
 
background, and racial stereotypes. ―So what you‘re  saying is that what 
counts is race above all? . . . You want underprivileged of a certain race 
and privileged of a certain race,‖ Kennedy noted.158 
 
The exchange revealed the severed tie between race-conscious 
affirmative action and disadvantage. UT‘s counsel had expressed an 
unfavorable judgment about the likely educational benefits of recruiting 
students who attend the schools and reside in the neighborhoods most 
obviously scarred by Jim Crow and present inequality.159 The segregated, 
racially identifiable schools that the lawyer mentioned are located in 
districts, including Houston, Corpus Christi, Austin, and Dallas, where 
inequities have been documented in lawsuit after lawsuit.160 State and 
federal courts repeatedly have intervened in many of these districts to 
mandate improvements. Some courts maintain jurisdictions in education 
reform lawsuits in these areas to this very day.161 The issue of school 
equity in the  state‘s deeply racially-polarized school system also remains 
alive in the Texas legislature. Controversies over how to allocate funding 
to poor, minority districts are ubiquitous.162 Middle and upper-income 
whites have fled residential areas and schools where blacks and Latinos 
live, leaving behind numerous impoverished, majority-minority 
districts—deeply stigmatized on account of race, poverty, and place. 163 
 
 
158 See id at 45. 
159 See id at 45–47. 
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162 See Tovia Smith,  Judge  Rules Texas‘  School-Funding  Method 
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To be sure, legal strategy drove  counsel‘s assertion  in open  court 
that students of color who arrive at UT from  Texas‘s  segregated and 
inferior schools cannot be expected to counter stereotypes, provide 
campus leadership, or make positive contributions. That this legal 
strategy is necessary exposes a little-acknowledged reality in affirmative 
action programs today. Affirmative action programs, as currently 
conceived and implemented, are loosely tethered to the social mobility 
mission for the truly disadvantaged that once motivated them. The 
policies touch on structural, embedded, and intergenerational inequality 
in only indirect, and as witnessed in Fisher, even perverse ways. 164 
 
The exchange in UT likely pulled the curtain back on a wider 
phenomenon: at selective universities nationwide, students from the 
poorest neighborhoods are hard to find, notwithstanding affirmative 
action.165 Recent studies have shown that immigrants, multiracial 
students, and Hispanics from more affluent backgrounds are particularly 
likely to be beneficiaries of race-conscious affirmative action.166 Black 
 
 
Marquez and Luke Winkie, Explosive Growth of Hispanics in Texas 
Bring Dramatic Changes to Schools (The Dallas Morning News May 3, 
2013), online at 
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grounds. Texas‘s  egregious history of discrimination and the continuing 
effects of that history, coupled with the diversity-based rationale for 
affirmative action upheld in Grutter v Bollinger, justified the policies. In 
other words, the  brief  made a  ―diversity-plus‖ argument that sought to 
tether concerns about visible diversity, now fashionable in many 
quarters, to substantive matters of equal justice. See generally 
Advancement Project Brief (cited in note). This type of argument 
sounded in the  same register as  President Johnson‘s 1965  address. But it 
runs counter to UT‘s idea  that the  applications of assimilated students of 
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be successful at UT (as compared to blacks and Hispanics who hail from 
majority-minority communities). 
165 See id at 18–29. 
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Admission and Campus Life, 299 (Princeton 2009) (describing results of 
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consideration are given to different underrepresented minority groups); 
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Americans, particularly those who are economically disadvantaged, are 
less likely to benefit from the policies.167 One study showed that 86 
percent of African American students at 28 elite colleges surveyed hailed 
from the middle or upper classes (and whites came from even more 
privileged households).168 
 
The discussion in oral argument at Fisher suggested the mindset 
behind these demographic results. Even if disadvantaged students meet 
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admissions thresholds,169 they may not be perceived as fitting seamlessly 
into the environment of the typical selective university. Officials may 
instead perceive disadvantaged students of color as  ―second-best‖ 
candidates  for admissions: ―good on paper‖ but uncertain to yield  the 
―benefits‖ of higher-income peers. 
 
D.  The Compelling Purpose of Race-Based Affirmative Action 
 
The primary purpose of affirmative action today is to enhance visible 
diversity on college campuses. The policies are not designed to address 
inequities related to family wealth, education, and social and cultural 
capital benefits that confer advantages on wealthier students of all races 
each admissions cycle. 
 
The more racially diverse college campuses that largely are the 
result of modern affirmative action programs are a vast improvement 
over the past. Selective universities today—multiracial, predominantly 
upper- and middle-class—are welcome departures from the 
predominantly white and predominantly upper-class campuses typical of 
the pre-Civil Rights Act era.170 The racial integration of elite institutions 
by middle and upper class students of color is invaluable. It creates 
wealth and social capital and may diminish racial stereotypes.171 These 
are compelling purposes. Communities of color consolidate their still 
tenuous hold on the American middle class172 within the context of 
persistent racial inequality that touches even well-off individuals.173 
 
 
169 See note 166 on the challenges of finding black and Hispanic 
applicants who are high achieving and poor. 
170 See Jerome Karabel, The Chosen: The Hidden History of Admission 
and Exclusion at Harvard, Yale, and Princeton (Houghton Mifflin 
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E. Conclusion 
 
However, the achievements of these relatively privileged groups 
should not cause us to overlook the fates of students who have not 
experienced a significant lift from affirmative action. Universities need 
not choose between policies that ameliorate race disadvantage of policies 
that ameliorate class disadvantage.174 They can embrace policies that 
address both. 
 
IV. THE OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE OF HIGHER EDUCATION TODAY 
 
Universities that wish to promote social mobility and ameliorate 
educational disadvantage must do more  than recruit a  ―diverse‖ student 
body through affirmative action policies.175 However, affirmative action 
is not the only policy that universities have employed to attract more 
diverse student bodies. In response to criticism, some universities have 
turned to class-based policies or financial aid  policies targeted  to  ―low- 
income‖ or ―needy‖ students. 
 
This  Part examines and critiques universities‘ efforts to serve a 
more economically heterogeneous student population by embracing such 
policies. The analysis in this part first considers the opportunity 
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structure in higher education today; that structure provides invaluable 
context for understanding the variety of factors that affect whether truly 
disadvantaged students matriculate and find success on selective 
campuses. These factors concern dynamics internal and external to 
higher education. 
 
A. Socio-Economic Disadvantage in Education 
 
The affluent enjoy an outsized advantage in  admission to the 
most prestigious colleges and universities, 176 and this advantage has 
only grown in recent years.177 Our society is becoming more unequal, and 
the educational advantage that the wealthy enjoy in higher education 
contributes to declining economic mobility.178 
 
A few statistics illustrate the wealth gap in higher education. 
Students from affluent backgrounds graduate from college at six times 
the rate of children from low-income households.179 For lower-income 
students, merely going to college is an achievement; fewer than 30 
percent of these students enroll in a four-year college.180 Of those who do 
matriculate, fewer than half graduate.181 The most damning statistics 
concern high-achieving students from low-income households. Even 
when students from low-income households outscore higher-income 
peers, they graduate from college at a lower rate.182 The poorest students 
with above-average test scores have a 26 percent college graduation rate 
compared to a 30 percent graduate rate for below-average scores from 
the wealthiest households.183 
 
A March 2013  study revealed significant ―under-matching‖—the 
phenomenon of high-ability, low-income students not even bothering to 
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apply to selective universities.184 Fifty-three percent of high-achieving, 
low-income students examined did not apply to universities for which 
they were academically matched.185 And only 8 percent of high-achieving 
students from low-income families applied to the range of safety, target, 
and reach colleges that college counselors advise (as compared to 64 
percent of high-achieving students from high-income families and 35 
percent of high-achieving students from middle-income families).186 
These statistics show  that, far from  serving as  ―great equalizers,‖ 
institutions of higher education too often serve to replicate the unequal 
structure of society. 
 
B.  How Socio-Economic Disadvantage Matters. 
 
The  categorical exclusion of the  ―lower classes‖ from  higher 
education and open rule of the plutocracy passed into history long ago.187 
Yet the advantage of the affluent at selective educational institutions 
remains. Multiple factors contribute to the persistent affluent advantage. 
 
1.   Financial factors. 
 
One critical factor is cost. In recent decades, the cost of tuition at 
American colleges and universities has risen annually by an average of 8 
percent; these tuition increases have outstripped the general rate of 
inflation by 1.2 to 2.1 times.188 In other words, there is little correlation 
between college and general inflation rates. The rising average costs 
translate into the following cold numbers:189 for the 2010–2011 academic 
year, annual undergraduate tuition, room, and board costs averaged 
$13,600 at public institutions, $36,300 at private not-for-profit 
institutions, and $23,500 at private for-profit institutions (in current 
dollars).190 Tuition, room, and board surpassed $50,000 annually at 123 
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universities in 2011–2012, including Harvard, Yale, Vassar, Williams, 
and Oberlin.191 Many students cover these costs by going into debt. In 
2012–2013, 34 percent of undergraduates borrowed federal loans to 
subsidize their education—to the tune of thousands of dollars.192 
 
These costs drive students from middle-income and working-class 
families out of higher education.193 Students from lower-income 
households are especially likely to become overwhelmed by the high costs 
of higher education.194 They are unaware of the considerable difference 
that may exist between advertised and actual cost.195 Given advertised or 
―sticker‖ prices, higher education appears a luxury to many students—an 
unaffordable and unwise investment.196 Overwhelmed by  ―sticker shock,‖ 
these students discount the well-documented returns in the labor market 
of an investment in a college degree.197 
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2.   Socio-cultural factors. 
 
Socio-cultural factors also contribute to the affluent advantage. 
Students who grow up in affluent and lower-income homes tend to be 
socialized differently regarding the cultural traits and linguistic skills 
required for success in secondary school and higher education.198 Upper- 
class and even well-connected middle-class parents engage in concerted 
efforts to cultivate achievement in their children.199 These strategies 
include organized leisure and cultural activities, conversations to teach 
comfortable interaction with authority figures, intervention in school 
placement and course selection decisions, and enrollment in after-school 
enrichment programs, among other efforts.200 By contrast, parents in 
lower-income homes nurture their children by emphasizing autonomy in 
play and in school.201 
 
Economic pressures shape these parenting styles. Upper- and 
middle-class parents have the leisure time to dote on children or the 
resources to hire others to do so.202 Lower-income parents leave children 
to their own devices, in part because the parents must focus on the 
necessities of daily existence: work, shelter, and food.203 
 
There is nothing inherently positive or negative about either 
approach to childrearing. However, in the context of the highly 
competitive American school system in which a more interactive 
approach is culturally dominant, the more autonomy-driven childrearing 
style can place the children of lower-income households at a 
disadvantage. Unwittingly, lower-income and less well-educated parents 
help to reproduce social and cultural hierarchies in which their children 
are marginalized.204 
 
These differences in social class emerge before students 
matriculate to high school and have long-lasting effects on college 
readiness and students‘ ability to compete in the admissions process.205 
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Most important, social class affects students‘ ability to accumulate the 
credentials—impressive grades from strong schools and high test 
scores—necessary to compete for admission to the selective schools.206 
Lower-income students generally attend weaker schools than wealthier 
students.207 Scores on the Scholastic Admissions Test (SAT) also are 
correlated with socioeconomic status; wealthy students from higher 
income households boast higher scores.208 
 
Even high-ability and well-credentialed students from lower- 
income backgrounds face social and cultural impediments that can 
hinder them in the competition for higher education admissions. Without 
the parental prodding, nurturance, and social networking typical in more 
affluent households, students from more modest backgrounds may not 
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even apply to college.209 Unfamiliar with the advantages conferred by 
selective colleges, these students might apply unwisely to college.210 
 
Once students arrive on campus, social class may continue to 
limit them. Students from affluent backgrounds maneuver more easily in 
the social environment on campus, an edge that can translate into 
greater ease in interacting with professors and in academic 
competition.211 Meanwhile, students from working-class backgrounds 
may experience social anxieties and create social silos as a result of 
cultural differences learned in family structures.212 The social distance 
can result in academic underperformance or even cause students to drop 
out of college.213 
 
C.  Reform Efforts: ―Low-Income‖ and Need-Based Aid Policies 
 
Faced with ongoing litigation over race-based affirmative action 
and with statistics showing how inaccessible higher education is for the 
poor, commentators have discussed inequality using new frameworks. 
Some have touted ―class-based‖ affirmative action as  a way  out  of the 
political and legal controversies over race-conscious programs.214 Others 
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have urged universities to recruit students from impoverished 
backgrounds.215 
 
Leaders in higher education have not been unresponsive to the 
commentary. Some selective universities—the only colleges to practice 
affirmative action in the first place—have reduced reliance on race- 
conscious admissions in recent years in favor of admission on the basis of 
class rank or other schemes that are facially race neutral.216 And 
following unflattering reports about the abysmal numbers of poor 
students enrolled at elite colleges, some universities began touting 
outreach efforts to ―low-income‖ students or broadly-inclusive need-based 
financial aid policies.217 
 
D. Problems with ―Low-income‖ and Need-Based Aid policies. 
 
Outreach to  ―low-income‖ or  ―needy‖ students on the basis of 
―class‖ may be well-intentioned,218 but it likely does not constitute a 
comprehensive response to the structural crisis in higher education. Nor 
does it adequately promote social mobility. In fact, the  ―low-income‖ 
category is not necessarily a good proxy for disadvantaged students at 
all—when disadvantage is defined as impoverished. The concept of 
―need‖ likewise can  be inadequate, depending on a university‘s overall 
resources and admissions strategy. 
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1. Definitional ambiguity. 
 
The  ―low-income‖ concept, it turns out, is strikingly imprecise 
terminology. When one looks beneath the surface, one finds that 
proposals for outreach on the basis of ―class‖ or ―low-income‖ are ill- 
defined by commentators and by universities that boast of the presence 
of ―low-income‖ students on campus.219 
 
Consider these categories. A widely discussed study on the 
difficulties that  ―high-achieving, low-income‖ students encounter in 
higher education defined the relevant students as those from households 
making less than $41,472 annually—the cut-off for the  ―bottom-quartile‖ 
of the income distribution.220 This figure is considerably lower than the 
median income for Americans—approximately $50,000.221 But it is 
considerably higher than the $30,000 income cut-off to qualify for Pell 
Grants, federal awards to poor students to defray the costs of higher 
education.222 The lower threshold, the Pell Grant eligibility cutoff, is 
favored by the federal government, many researchers who study access 
of the poor to higher education, and public universities that award 
financial aid to low-income students.223 
 
Many reasonable people might agree, however, that the range of 
students from the aforementioned example—those from families that 
earn from about $30,000 to $41,000—are far from well off. Thus, one 
might conclude, definitional ambiguity in the  ―low-income‖ category is 
not that much of a problem. 
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However, these two cut-off points, the bottom quartile of the 
income distribution and Pell Grant eligibility, hardly define the full 
spectrum of possible definitions of ―low-income.‖ The range of students 
who may benefit from admissions or financial aid policies that target 
students on the  basis of ―low-income,‖ ―class,‖ or ―need‖ is considerably 
broader. 
 
The term ―low-income‖ or concept of ―need‖ is defined broadly 
enough that households with quite high annual incomes may reap 
benefits. At many selective universities, the income range to qualify for 
financial aid is even higher—$60,000–75,000 annual income.224 That 
baseline is widely used among members of the Consortium on Financing 
Higher Education, a group of selective institutions that includes 
Harvard, Yale, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Amherst and 
Williams, among other leading schools.225 This range suggests that 
universities admit students from families whose incomes place them well 
in the middle class and then award them subsidies under the ―low- 
income‖ or ―need‖ rubric. 
 
In fact, many selective institutions have dispensed with a ―low- 
income‖ constraint on financial aid awards. At a select group of 
institutions, university policy covers student financial need with 
institutional aid rather than loans. At one time, these institutions 
imposed  a ―low-income‖ requirement on the  receipt of institutional aid.226 
Now, 67 percent of these institutions no longer do.227 Princeton 
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University no longer requires students to identify as  ―low-income‖ to 
qualify for its ―no-loan‖ financial aid  policy,  for example.228 At Harvard 
College, students from families with incomes that exceed the cut-off for 
the top quartile of income—as high as $150,000—can take advantage of 
the  college‘s generous financial aid programs.229 Students from families 
with incomes up to $150,000 pay 0 to 10 percent of annual income to 
support students‘ education, and some who earn more than $150,000 
annually qualify for aid.230 Reed College assures students that they need 
not be  ―poor‖ to qualify for financial aid.231 The median family income of 
a student awarded financial aid is $74,000, the college‘s website notes.232 
And, it continues:  ―That‘s just the  median. In some  cases, the  family 
income may be considerably higher. For example, a family earning 
$270,000 with a second child in a private college could still be eligible for 
$10,000 in aid  from  Reed.‖233 
 
On the one hand, these outcomes can be applauded. The costs of 
higher education are so extraordinary, one might conclude, that even 
quite well-off families legitimately benefit from the subsidies that at 
least a few well-endowed universities are able to pay. 
 
On the other hand, the reality of need among the relatively 
wealthy only circles back to the question of why costs are so high. 
 
Moreover, one might also wonder if truly impoverished students 
are crowded out by generous financial aid policies for upper-middle-class 
and wealthy students. Marvelously, the crowding out effect should  not 
occur at the wealthiest and most-selective universities—Harvard, Yale, 
Princeton, and Stanford, for example.234 However, crowding out does 
occur at less well-endowed private and public universities—the 
institutions most within reach of impoverished students. At the majority 
of these institutions the aid packages offered to the neediest students are 
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not especially generous, or not generous enough to preclude substantial 
loan debt or even scare away potential applicants.235 
 
Furthermore, the baselines for aid awards suggest that the 
student bodies at selective institutions are extraordinarily affluent, 
compared to most Americans.236 Harvard—the pinnacle of American 
higher education and market leader—provides a useful example of the 
affluence common on elite college campuses. In 2013, after an increase in 
the admission of low-income students, 20 percent of Harvard‘s freshman 
class hailed from those households.237 Yet, 53 percent of Harvard‘s 
freshman class came from families making at least $125,000 a year, an 
income that places them in the highest income quartile in the nation.238 
And 29 percent of Harvard‘s freshman class  came  from  families making 
at least $250,000.239 The demographic profiles of Harvard‘s peer schools 
are similar. At Yale University, 69 percent of the freshman class comes 
from families that earn more than $120,000 annually.240 Sixteen percent 
are from families that earn between $66,000 and $120,000 annually.241 
These institutions, overwhelmingly populated by wealthy students, 
routinely serve extraordinarily small numbers of Pell Grant recipients— 
students from indisputably needy families.242 
 
The range of definitions of economic disadvantage that 
universities employ demonstrates that recruitment on the basis of class 
or  ―low-income‖ status is a comparative concept. ―Low-income‖ is not  an 
absolute value and could even be a relatively meaningless concept. The 
same is true of ―need‖-based institutional aid awards. 
 
How universities use their discretion makes all the difference to 
what low-income or assessments of need means. As it now stands, 
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nothing prevents universities from conferring benefits in admissions and 
financial aid upon relatively wealthy students, although programs are 
targeted on the basis of need. Intentionally or not, elite institutions can 
reproduce the social structure in an Orwellian guise. 
 
2.  Income: an unstable category. 
 
Even if universities accepted a common and reasonable definition 
of ―low income‖ or ―need,‖ a further problem would remain: variability. 
Income is not a stable category. It can vary widely over time, and it only 
attains meaning in relation to other variables such as region, family size, 
and the cost of goods and services, including education itself.243 
 
For these reasons, the low-income label or concept of ―need‖ does 
not necessarily convey much information. ―Low-income‖ or ―neediness‖ 
might refer to students who truly are disadvantaged by most standards, 
or it might only capture relatively disadvantaged students. What the 
label actually means is critically important. 
 
3.  Variable Admissions Rates. 
 
A third problem concerns the wide variation among selective 
universities in admission rates of ―low-income‖ students, however 
defined, and certainly when defined as Pell Grant-eligible students.244 
Even universities with large endowments educate relatively few truly 
impoverished students. 245 The relative absence of poorer students from 
selective institutions is clear, despite some institutions‘ loudly-stated 
interest in  ―low-income‖ students. 
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The gap between rhetoric and reality is not difficult to explain. 
First, selectivity undermines economic diversity.246 Admissions 
committees continue to rely on criteria—particularly scores on 
standardized tests—that favor students from wealthier households.247 
The commitment to recruiting poorer students itself is selective. 
Universities are interested in poorer students who can gain entry 
without significant relaxation of admissions requirements or need for 
academic support.248 In other words, colleges prefer, quite 
understandably, to admit the students perceived as the easiest to 
educate. 
 
Second, the overwhelming majority of universities practice 
―strategic‖ enrollment,249 and ―need-sensitive‖ admissions is an element 
of strategic planning250 In 2012, only 46 of 1,130 colleges and universities 
claimed to be need-blind; that is, admissions officials are attentive to 
ability to pay in making admissions decisions.251 As between similarly 
 
 
246 See Jerome Karabel, The Chosen: The Hidden History of Admission 
and Exclusion at Harvard, Yale and Princeton 537 (Houghton Mifflin 
Harcourt 2005) (noting claim by Ivy League presidents that the dearth of 
poor and working-class  students able  to meet ―high academic 
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247 See Hillman, Economic Diversity Among Selective Colleges at 10–11 
(cited in note 196). 
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Handbook for the College Admissions Professional (Henderson et al, eds, 
Greenwood 1998) (discussing optimum student recruitment and 
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stability and optimal qualifications); see also Douglas Lederman, 
Enrollment Managers Struggle with Image, Inside Higher 
Education.com, Mar 27, 2008 (discusses how enrollment managers 
balance goals of increasing net revenue by recruiting full pay students 
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http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2008/03/27/enroll. , 
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qualified applicants, these universities hope to attract students who can 
both meet admissions criteria and afford to pay at least some of the costs 
of attendance.252 Because the admission of truly impoverished students is 
costly, these individuals are less attractive candidates to many 
institutions. Consequently, many selective universities tend not to admit 
many truly poor students.253 The trend toward need-aware admissions 
has only increased in recent years as the value of college endowments 
has declined.254 
 
E.  Conclusion 
 
For all of the foregoing reasons, universities that wish to attract a 
student body that better reflects the American socioeconomic spectrum 
must consider different policies. They must better identify talented and 
truly disadvantaged students and better support them if they 
matriculate. 
 
Part V. 
THE RETURN: SOCIAL MOBILITY AND DISADVANTAGE AS 
FRAMEWORKS FOR HIGHER EDUCATION TODAY 
With greater analytical precision, universities can promote 
broader access to higher education for talented, truly disadvantaged 
students. Instead of falling back  on  ―diversity‖ or turning to nebulously- 
defined ―low-income‖ or ―neediness‖ status as proxies for disadvantage, 
universities must attack disadvantage at its roots. Selective institutions 
can directly address disadvantage by prioritizing first-generation, Pell 
Grant-eligible status in admissions, financial aid, and institutional 
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outreach. First-generation, Pell-Grant-eligible status is an analytically 
precise proxy for truly needy students. It avoids much, if not all, of the 
subjectivity associated with holistic, diversity-based admissions and 
need-based policies deployed as proxies for disadvantage. Moreover, a 
shift of focus to first-generation college students has the virtue of 
reinforcing the idea of social mobility through education—a cherished 
element of America‘s national identity. By facilitating greater upward 
social mobility, such policies also would enhance fairness and efficiency 
in higher education. 
 
A.  How first-generation status matters. 
 
First-generation, Pell Grant-eligible students constitute a 
unique—and uniquely needy—pool of applicants. Unlike students 
recruited on grounds of ―diversity,‖ ―low-income,‖ or ―need,‖ these 
students are educationally disadvantaged by definition. In contrast to 
the ―low-income‖ label, which can be ambiguous in the ways described 
above, or need-based categories, the meaning of first-generation status is 
more concrete. A first-generation collegian is a student whose parents 
did not pursue postsecondary education; the student is the first in her 
immediate family to matriculate to college.255 The federal government 
and a broad range of institutions and researchers define first-generation 
student consistently, with only minor differences.256 When first- 
 
 
255 See National Center for Education Statistics, First-Generation 
Students: Undergraduates Whose Parents Never Enrolled in 
Postsecondary Education (1998) (defining first-generation students as 
those who parents did not  pursue postsecondary education, a bachelor‘s 
degree, in particular), online at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs98/98082.pdf; 
Higher Education Act of 1965, SEC. 402A. 20 USC 1070a–11 (defining 
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bachelor‘s degree); Jennifer Engle and Vincent Tinto, Moving Beyond 
Access: College Success For Low Income, First-Generation Students 20 
(The Pell Institute 2008), online at 
http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED504448.pdf (visited Feb 7, 2014) 
(describing first-generation as students whose parents do not have a 
bachelor‘s degree); Saenz, et al, First in my Family at vi (cited in note 
45). 
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Carmen Tym, Robin McMillion, Sandra Barone and Jeff Webster, First- 
Generation College Students: A Literature Review 1 (2001) online at 
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variation relates to treatment of siblings and degrees from two-year 
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generation status is combined with Pell Grant eligibility, it is a highly 
reliable indicator of difficulties along multiple dimensions that affect 
success in higher education.257 
 
Reams of data show that first-generation students who also are 
poor (that is, Pell-Grant eligible) face numerous disadvantages in higher 
education. These constraints fall into three main categories: financial, 
socio-cultural, and academic. These students lack parental financial 
support for educational pursuits258 and do not benefit from parental 
guidance about postsecondary education, including the college 
application and financial aid processes.259 They typically attend 
secondary schools in smaller towns or rural communities, where they 
are less likely to have access to a rigorous high school curriculum.260 
They garner less impressive scores on standardized admissions tests261 
and disproportionately are members of racial and ethnic minorities.262 
None of these factors position these students well in higher education. 
 
Despite these disadvantages, some of these students also possess 
traits that, if nurtured, can facilitate success: intelligence, ambition, 
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at http://www2.ed.gov/finaid/prof/resources/data/pell-2011-12/pell-eoy- 
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http://scholarlyrepository.miami.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1319&co 
ntext=oa_dissertations (visited Feb 7, 2014). 
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discipline, perseverance, and passion—or grit.263 We can look to Howard 
Schultz, Starbucks CEO;264 Michelle Obama, First Lady of the United 
States;265 and Sonia Sotomayor, Associate Supreme Court Justice,266 as 
examples of the serious challenges and tremendous possibility that live 
within these students. 
 
B. First-generation status and educational disadvantage. 
 
First-generation, low-income students start life far behind peers 
who grow up in homes with well-educated parents. Unlike upper-class 
peers, they typically are not groomed for success from extraordinarily 
young ages.267 They are not enrolled in choice preschools or admitted to 
high  schools  considered ―feeders‖ to selective universities. 268 
 
If children from first-generation backgrounds do develop an 
interest in higher education, parents may not support the pursuit.269 
Having not pursued postsecondary education themselves, these parents 
may  resist their offspring‘s interest in a different—and alien—way of 
life.270 Some prefer that students immediately enter the workforce 
rather than matriculate to college.271 Even if parents want to be 
 
 
 
263 On the  relevance of ―grit,‖ see Angela Duckworth, Perseverance and 
Passion for Long-Term Goals, 92 J. of Personality & Soc. Psy. 1097-1101 
(2007). 
264 On Howard Schultz‘s family and educational backgrounds, see 
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housing project with father, an Army veteran and truck driver, and 
homemaker mother, and its impact on his life). 
265 On Michelle Obama‘s family and educational background, which she 
has invoked to promote an educational initiative to increase the number 
of low-income students in college, see Krissah Thompson and Zachary 
Goldfarb, Michelle Obama Uses Life Story to Promote Education 
Initiative (Wash Post Jan 17, 2014), online at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/michelle-obama-uses-life-story- 
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130, 135 (Knopf 2013). 
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supportive, they do not possess the insider knowledge about college life 
that could help their children plan for and negotiate the application 
process.272 School counselors underestimate the talents and ambition of 
these students and often do not step into the breach; guidance 
counselors provide less—not more—support with college applications for 
first-generation college students.273 First-generation students often must 
negotiate the path to college on their own. 
 
Due in part to a lack of understanding about higher education 
and associated costs, first-generation students often make unwise 
enrollment choices. The overwhelming majority of undergraduate 
students from this demographic—65 percent—enroll in two-year 
colleges or for-profit institutions.274 This choice is unwise because 
resources per student are much lower and drop-out rates much higher 
at two-year institutions than at four-year colleges and universities.275 
Moreover, the return on investment and occupational mobility is 
greater for graduates from four-year colleges.276 An informed decision 
maker would opt for the four-year college. 
 
C.  First-generation status and economic hardship. 
 
First-generation students from impoverished background confront 
pervasive economic hardships that present especially dire challenges in 
an era of rapidly-rising college costs. These students lack parents or 
other family members who can afford to provide financial support for 
full-time study.277 Consequently, these students frequently make a 
logical but educationally ill-advised choice: they enroll in college on a 
part-time basis and work to support themselves.278 The obligation to 
work undermines students‘ ability to focus  on academics and is a risk 
factor in the failure to graduate from college.279 
 
The financial aid process also poses complex challenges for needy 
first-generation students. Without access to significant parental financial 
support, they can demonstrate greater financial need than other 
students280 and pay less at some high-cost institutions.281 However, many 
high-cost universities award more non-need-based than need-based 
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aid.282 This policy drives first-generation students to federal sources of 
aid—the  lion‘s share of which takes the  form  of student loans.283 
Moreover, most of these students attend two-year and for-profit 
institutions that offer little financial aid.284 In these institutional 
contexts, students must incur significant student loan debt.285 The need 
to borrow large sums to attend college diminishes the likelihood that the 
students who have the  most to gain  from attaining a bachelor‘s degree 
ever matriculate, or if they do matriculate, ever graduate.286 
 
D.  First-generation status and race/ethnicity. 
 
Disproportionate numbers of first-generation, low-income 
students are triply-disadvantaged on account of their parents‘ 
educational status, income, and race/ethnicity. Racial minorities are 
over-represented among first-generation students: 38 percent of Latinos, 
22.6 percent of African-Americans, 16.8 percent of Native Americans, 19 
percent of Asians, and 13.2 percent of whites are first-generation college 
students.287 Immigrants also are disproportionately represented.288 
Consequently, recruitment on the basis of first-generation status 
ameliorates race- and ethnicity-based disadvantage, but does so while 
specifically targeting students who are economically disadvantaged. To 
that extent, first-generation, Pell Grant-eligible recruitment is more 
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175) (showing 16 and 16.7 years as parents‘ educational years for the 
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narrowly targeted than the race-based ―diversity‖ initiatives embraced 
after Bakke v California.289 
 
It is important to note, however, that whites outnumber all other 
groups of first-generation applicants who meet threshold admission 
requirements to selective universities.290 Therefore, a policy that 
privileges first-generation status will disproportionately benefit whites 
(who are disproportionately qualified by traditional selection criteria). 
Thus, the focus on first-generation status will advance collective 
interests by addressing disadvantage across all demographic categories. 
 
E.  First-generation status and place. 
 
First-generation students of ability exist in all communities, 
urban and rural, suburban and exurban. Nevertheless, students in rural 
areas deserve special concern in any effort to recruit the disadvantaged. 
The problems of first-generation, impoverished students are, to a large 
extent, the problems of people who live outside of urban areas. 
 
The relationship between residence in rural areas and 
disadvantage animated President Johnson‘s landmark civil rights 
initiatives as much as his awareness of racial injustice.291 In the years 
since passage of the CRA and EOA, urbanormativity292 has captured the 
public and scholarly imaginations.293 The resulting inattention to rural 
disadvantage, and its relationship to racial and educational 
disadvantage, has not undermined the stubborn fact that place is highly 
salient to life chances. 
 
For several decades, proportionately fewer adults in rural areas 
have enrolled in postsecondary education than their urban counterparts. 
Whereas 30 percent of adults who live in urban areas attain bachelor‘s 
degrees,294 only 13 percent of adults in rural areas do.295 The populations 
in rural areas suffer from significant economic disadvantage, but it is 
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often disregarded. In policy circles and on television, poverty is urban; 
however, the reality is different. For years, poverty rates in non- 
metropolitan areas have outstripped those in metropolitan areas.296 
Disadvantage in rural areas encompasses multiracial populations, 
although rural areas are white in the popular image.297 Thirty-five 
percent of African-Americans and 34 percent of Native Americans who 
live in rural areas are poor.298 Economic disadvantage in these 
populations is influenced, in turn, by historic economic and educational 
inequalities.299 
 
When students from smaller towns and rural areas manage to 
attend college, they are far less likely to attend the selective institutions 
that offer the greatest return on investment than peers in metropolitan 
areas.300 The difference in life outcomes results, in part, from the 
stronghold of geography and kinship ties on rural people, particularly 
those who live in areas that support major industries sustained by local 
people.301 Isolation from the social networks that provide knowledge 
about the value of higher education and the college admission process 
also influences the rural-urban gap in college matriculation.302 Whatever 
the cause of the comparative deficits, the differences limit the earnings 
capacity of rural students and make a college education particularly 
useful.303 
 
F.  First-generation students‘ academic profile. 
 
Given all of the factors cited above, it should come as no surprise 
that first-generation, impoverished students start from a different 
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academic baseline than others. Most, though by no means all, of these 
students tend to be less prepared for college than more affluent peers.304 
The relative under-preparedness stems from lack of opportunity. First- 
generation students lack access to, and therefore tend not to enroll in, 
the rigorous high-school courses considered gateways to college.305 These 
students also generally post less impressive scores on standardized tests 
than students from households with more affluent, better-educated 
parents.306 According to the College Board, for every year between 2005 
and 2010, results on the SAT have marched in lock step with family 
income and education.307 Because scores on these tests influence the 
admissions process at selective institutions, these students tend to look 
less impressive, as an empirical matter, than students from households 
with more affluent, better-educated parents.308 
 
G. First-generation status and culture. 
 
Bundled together, all of the aforementioned factors translate into 
significant cultural challenges for poor, first-generation students in 
higher education. In essence, the students face a difficulty inherent in 
navigating two different worlds—the familiar home environment versus 
the alien campus environment. The experience of being torn between 
worlds and identities can leave these students feeling adrift, without 
validation of their presence on campus and without confidence.309 
Emotional distress can result from this internal war and struggle to 
belong.310   If universities want to attract and retain these students, 
intervention is required. 
 
G.  Three Pillars of Intervention 
 
The financial, academic, and socio-cultural challenges that first- 
generation, Pell-Grant-eligible students face are substantial, but not 
insurmountable, difficulties.311 Intervention can increase the odds of 
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success in higher education. Some programs geared to this demographic, 
including federally-financed ones, already exist. However, the majority of 
these programs tend to funnel first-generation students into two-year 
colleges.312 These institutions often are dead ends.313 
 
This section proposes a first-generation project that focuses on 
three pillars of intervention: concrete admission goals, financial aid and 
counseling, and institutional outreach. Each element is discussed below. 
 
1.   Concrete admissions goals. 
 
First-generation college students benefit greatly from access to 
selective institutions of higher education.314 A degree from a selective 
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institution can lift such an individual into the middle class or beyond and 
into a whole new way of life. The return on investment in education at a 
selective institution of higher education is fundamental to the 
transition.315 Graduation rates are higher at selective institutions, as are 
the wages of students who obtain degrees from them.316 
 
Presently, a few selective colleges do a fine job of recruiting and 
retaining these students.317 However, great disparity exists among 
colleges in the rates at which first-generation, poor students attend.318 
More can be done to increase access.319 
 
The admissions office can play a critical role in promoting social 
mobility in our nation. Officials can make this contribution by selecting 
for first-generation, impoverished status in the admissions process.320 It 
is a criterion that has the virtue of being race-neutral, and, by definition, 
an indicator of a student in need and one who has a potentially life- 
changing experience to gain from access to selective colleges. Many 
 
 
 
 
315 Selective, as used here, is not a synonym for exclusive or ―Ivy League;‖ 
the list of selective colleges and universities includes a wide variety of 
institutions. The pecking order includes the most competitive research 
universities, familiar names such as Harvard, Yale, and Princeton, as 
well as renowned liberal arts colleges, such as Amherst and Williams. 
Less familiar, highly competitive private colleges such as Skidmore, 
Grinnell, and Trinity, where students benefit from a low faculty-student 
ratio and a small environment, also number among selective institutions. 
Large universities—Syracuse, Clemson, and Georgia—also make the list. 
All of these institutions admit students across a range of test scores and 
grades. See Rankings by Selectivity (cited in note 314). 
 
316 Anthony P. Carnevale and Jeff Strohl, How Increasing College Access 
is Increasing Inequality, and What to Do about it, in Richard D. 
Kahlenberg, ed, Rewarding Strivers: Helping Low-Income Students 
Success in College 71, 111–112 (Century Foundation 2010). 
317 See note 240. 
318 See Appendix for a comparison of reported matriculation rates of 
underrepresented minorities and first-generation students at some 
selective universities. The data are extraordinarily difficult to access. 
Universities either do not maintain or release figures on first-generation 
students. 
319 See note 240–244 and accompanying notes. 
320 During the initial stages of the admissions process, colleges and 
universities know that students intend to apply for financial aid and 
have a good idea whether students are eligible for Pell Grants. Actual 
Pell Grant eligibility determinations are made during the financial aid 
applicable process. On Pell Grant timetables, see     59 
 
 
universities already proclaim an interest in needy students; what is 
needed is a mechanism to transform aspirations into commitments. 
 
Because many universities have not fundamentally changed when 
left to their own devices, policies that nudge them toward action are in 
order. Concrete goals may help to increase the presence of first- 
generation, impoverished students on campus. In much the same way 
that colleges in the past set recruitment goals for women and minorities, 
universities should be encouraged to set targets for the recruitment of 
first-generation students.321 (But unlike in the context of gender or race 
goal, admission targets for first-generation students would not be 
mandatory.) At a selective institution, a reasonable target for a 
substantial percentage of truly disadvantaged students might be at least 
20 percent first-generation, Pell-Grant eligible.322 
 
Universities must weigh standardized test scores less heavily in 
admissions decisions in order to recruit a sizeable number of first- 
generation, Pell Grant-eligible students.323 For, as both the College 
Board and universities well know, test scores correlate with family 
wealth; the scores of first-generation students from poorer households 
typically are less impressive than those of wealthier students.324 
 
Many selective universities already disclaim overreliance on test 
scores, 325 but aggregate evidence suggests otherwise. Low admission 
 
 
321 See Seth A. Goldberg, A Proposal for Reconciling Affirmative Action 
with Nondiscrimination Under the Contractor Antidiscrimination 
Program, 30 Stan L Rev 803, 806–08 & n 2 (1978) (describing Executive 
Order 11,246 requiring government contractors to develop numerical 
goals and timetables for hiring of women and minorities and its 
effectiveness). See also Exec Order No 11246 (1965). 
322 Selective institutions that have managed to achieve at least 20 
percent Pell Grant recipients are MIT, Grinnell, Vassar, Wellesley, and 
Williams College. See Stephen Burd, Undermining Pell: How College 
Compete for Wealthy Students and Leave the Low-Income Behind 8–9 
(New America Foundation 2013). 
323 For an astute discussion of how admissions criteria figure into the 
debate over access to higher education, see Lani Guinier, Admissions 
Rituals as Political Acts: Guardians at the Gates of Our Democratic 
Ideals, 117 Harv L Rev 113, 123 (Nov 2003). 
324 See Saenz, et al, First in my Family at 4 (cited in note 45). See also 
Strauss, The Bottom Line on the SAT in One Chart (cited in note 208). 
325 See, for example, Scott Jashkik, How They Really Get In (Inside High 
Education Apr 9, 2012), online at 
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2012/04/09/new-research-how-elite- 
colleges-make-admissions-decisions (visited Feb 7, 2014) (noting that 
while selective institutions all claim to practice holistic admissions, 76 60 
 
 
rates of lower-income students who actually manage to meet test score 
means (the so-called ―high-ability, low-income‖ students) cast doubt on 
the notion that most selective institutions deviate substantially from 
reported median scores.326 So does a 2012 study that found that although 
selective institutions  all  claim  to practice ―holistic‖ admissions, 76 
percent of surveyed institutions begin the admissions process by 
winnowing applicants by grades, test scores, and other conventional 
factors.327 
 
These institutions cannot credibly cite an ironclad commitment to 
rigorous standards as a rationale for excluding needy students. 
Deviations from the ―standards‖ are commonplace—for wealthy students, 
in particular. Admissions officials at 20 percent of private liberal arts 
colleges  ―admit[] full-pay students with lower grades and test scores than 
other applicants.‖328  Institutions that routinely practice affirmative 
action for the wealthy should be amenable to admitting competitive first- 
generation students in larger numbers.329 
 
Bakke, long viewed as a precedent supportive of race-conscious 
affirmative action, also could support a thumb on the scale for Pell 
Grant-eligible students. Admissions officials could choose to define 
―educational benefits‖ of diversity in a way that values socioeconomic 
differences and the ability to interact with students across socio- 
economic lines. Nothing about the  Supreme Court‘s reasoning in 
affirmative action cases requires such a definition of diversity. But 
nothing prevents it either. 
 
2. Financial aid and counseling. 
 
 
 
 
percent of surveyed institutions winnow applicants using factors such as 
grades or test scores). 
326 See id. See also note 316 and accompanying text. 
327 See Jashkik, How They Really Get In  (cited in note). 
328 Id at 4. 
329 Amherst College has been a leader among selective institutions in 
recruiting Pell Grant eligible students. Anthony Marx, the former 
president of the college, catalyzed change at the elite liberal arts college 
by arguing that the exclusion of able but poor students undermined 
meritocracy. In 2011, the year Marx resigned for a new position, 22 
percent of Amherst‘s student  body received Pell Grants—whereas in 
2005, only 13 percent of the student body qualified for the grants; these 
students paid an average net price of $448. See Burd, Undermining Pell 
at 8 (cited in note 322). See David Leonhardt, Top Colleges, Largely for 
the Elite (NY Times May 24, 2011), online at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/25/business/economy/25leonhardt.html? 
pagewanted=all (visited Feb 7, 2014). 61 
 
 
In response to concern about rising costs in higher education,330 
selective universities have enacted reforms, but the changes fall short for 
many students in the target population discussed here. The turn to ―no- 
loan‖ aid policies by a group of highly selective universities made the 
biggest splash. Between 1998 and 2011, a group of sixty-five selective 
institutions, led by Princeton University,331 eliminated loans from many 
students‘ aid  packages; the colleges replaced loans with scholarships and 
grants awarded from the institutions‘ own budgets.332 As a result of these 
policies, many students who attend these universities graduate debt-free 
or substantially free of debt.333 
 
Despite all of the attention to the initiatives, it is not at all clear 
that these policies have measurably increased access to the lowest- 
income students.334 Instead of fundamentally altering the economic 
make-up of these institutions,335 the programs have inspired only 
―modest‖ changes in the  enrollment of this group of students.336 Other 
factors that impede access—including lack of access to quality secondary 
education, credentials, social and cultural factors, and sticker shock— 
continue to suppress the numbers of poor students on campus.337 
Because no parallel effort has been taken to identify, admit, and 
matriculate truly poor students, elite institutions are deploying their 
generous financial aid policies to subsidize solidly middle-class or even 
well-off students.338 
 
Moreover, the no-loan institutions, which have declined from a 
high of 65 to 46, are outliers.339 The quality of financial aid provided to 
 
 
330 An investigation into spending by university endowments by the U.S. 
Senate Committee on Finance in which Senator Charles Grassley 
explicitly mentioned rising tuition costs garnered considerable attention. 
See Financial Affairs: Why the Endowment-Spending Debate Matters 
Now More Than Ever (Chronicle of High Education Mar 7, 2010), online 
at http://chronicle.com/article/Why-the-Endowment-Debate/64527/ 
(visited Feb 7, 2014). 
331 See Hillman, Economic Diversity Among Selective Colleges at 2 (cited 
in note 196). 
332 See id. 
333 See id. 
334 See id at 8. 
335 See Hillman, Economic Diversity Among Selective Colleges at 8 (cited 
in note 196). 
336 See id. 
337 See id at 5. See also notes 196–197 and Error! Bookmark not 
defined. and accompanying text. 
338 See notes 229–233. 
339 See Kelsey Sheehy, Colleges That Claim to Meet Full Need, US News 
& World Report, Sept. 18, 2013, online at 62 
 
 
poorer students at the overwhelming majority of institutions remains a 
significant problem. Most institutions of higher education have not made 
a significant commitment to the financial support of students for whom 
cost is truly a major factor affecting enrollment.340 The majority of 
institutions of higher education (as distinguished from the few no-loan 
universities) do not offer especially generous aid packages to needy 
students. Two-thirds of private colleges and one-third of public colleges 
engage in the practice of ―gapping‖—making financial aid awards that do 
not come close to meeting financial need.341 As a result of this practice, 
students are required to take out educational loans if they hope to enroll 
in college, a policy that, in turn, discourages enrollment.342 
 
Many colleges and universities can afford to award more generous 
financial aid packages to truly needy students, but do not.343 They 
instead have made strategic decisions to favor wealthier families by 
awarding more them various kinds of tuition discounts.344 In an era of 
declining endowments and budget tightening,345 a commitment to 
financial support of first-generation, impoverished students may imply a 
recalibration of aid policies away from policies that favor those with 
higher incomes. 
 
Currently, no comprehensive database documents what 
proportion of first-generation students colleges and universities admit 
and financially support through their own institutional aid coffers. 
 
 
 
 
http://www.usnews.com/education/best-colleges/paying-for- 
college/articles/2013/09/18/colleges-that-claim-to-meet-full-financial- 
need-2014 (visited 3/21/14). 
340 See Saenz, et al, First in my Family at 23 (cited in note 45). 
341 See Burd, Undermining Pell at 4 (cited in note 322). 
342 See id. 
343 See id at 1. 
344 On this point, Burd writes: 
Some  of the  country‘s most prosperous private colleges  are, in fact, 
the stingiest with need-based aid. These institutions tend to use 
their institutional financial aid as a competitive tool to reel in the 
top students, as well as the most affluent, to help them climb in 
the US News & World Report rankings and maximize their 
revenue. 
Id at 1, 5–6, 11 (discussing the impact of award of merit aid instead of 
need-based aid). 
345 See James B. Stewart, A Hard Landing for Many University 
Endowments (NY Times Oct 12, 2012), online at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/13/business/colleges-and-universities- 
invest-in-unconventional-ways.html (visited Feb 7, 2014) (discussing 
underperformance of college endowments). 63 
 
 
Universities are not eager to share these figures; in fact, they seem to be 
closely guarded secrets. 
 
The Department of Education can promote better outcomes for 
the disadvantaged in admissions and financial aid through its data 
collection, monitoring, investigatory, and powers to suspend federal 
funding. The Department can nudge institutions in the preferred 
direction by mandating that they make publicly available records 
showing how many first-generation, Pell Grant-eligible students are 
admitted and financially supported.346 
 
The basis for oversight exists in the Higher Education 
Opportunity Act (HEOA).347 Originally enacted as a part of President 
Johnson‘s Great Society programs, the HEOA authorizes funding to 
universities to support education for disadvantaged students.348 
President Johnson urged passage of the law  to  ―extend the  opportunity 
for higher education more broadly among lower and middle income 
families‖ and to  ―draw upon  the unique and invaluable resources of our 
great universities to deal with national problems of poverty and 
community development.‖349 Pell Grants are authorized pursuant to the 
HEOA.350 The Department of Education monitors and enforces the 
HEOA351 and already mandates reporting of many kinds of data 
 
 
346 The President has proposed a new college rating system designed to 
make college more affordable in which average tuition, share of low- 
income students served, and effectiveness in ensuring students graduate 
with manageable debt  levels  are  factors in determining an  institution‘s 
rating. See Nick Anderson and Philip Rucker, Obama Proposes College 
Rating System That Could Increase Affordability (Wash Post Aug 22, 
2013), online at http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-to- 
propose-college-ranking-system-that-could-increase- 
affordability/2013/08/22/73e674c0-0b17-11e3-b87c- 
476db8ac34cd_story.html (visited Feb 7, 2014). Highly ranked colleges 
might merit more federal student aid. Id. Colleges have cried foul, 
claiming that the ranking system would harm students. Id. 
347 Pub L 110-315, 122 Stat 3078 (2008), codified at 20 USC § 1101 et seq. 
Because first-generation students are not a legally protected class, 
Congress cannot use its powers under Title VI to mandate change as it 
has in the past. See notes 49–53 and accompanying text. 
348 See id. 
349   See Higher Education Act of 1965, House of Representatives Report 
No. 621 at 3 (July 14, 1965). 
350 See Pub L 110-315, 122 Stat 3078 (2008), codified at 20 USC § 1101 et 
seq 
351 There is no private right of action to enforce the statute or 
implementing regulations. See, for example, Gibbs v SLM Corp, 336 F 
Supp 2d 1, 14 (D Mass 2004). 64 
 
 
pursuant to its HEOA authority.352 It collects admissions data, test score 
and demographic information, including race, graduation rates, and 
average net price paid per student.353 
 
Mandatory reporting about first-generation students as a 
condition of receipt of full HEOA funding would complement but not 
unduly expand existing obligations.354 The Department of Education 
already possesses authority to use negative publicity as an enforcement 
stick against institutions that fail to comply with  HEOA.355 Disclosures 
about limited access to first-generation students, when publicized and 
subjected to scrutiny, should also promote greater equity. 
 
 
 
 
3.   Institutional outreach. 
 
First-generation, Pell Grant-eligible students require special 
efforts to address social and cultural factors that can undermine access 
to and success in college. Recent initiatives have focused on identifying 
and recruiting students who show unusual talent and determination to 
excel. Organizations such as Questbridge356 and Posse Foundation,357 
which link disadvantaged students with selective institutions on a fee- 
for-service basis, are one avenue for recruitment. However, the fees 
universities must pay  to participate in the  organizations‘ matching 
services and the constraints on college choice and early admission 
deadlines associated with the matching process are drawbacks to these 
models.358 
 
 
352 See College Navigator (National Center for Education Statistics), 
online at http://nces.ed.gov/collegenavigator/ (visited Feb 7, 2014). 
353 See IPEDS Data Center, online at 
http://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/datacenter/SelectVariables.aspx?stepId=1 
(visited Feb 7, 2014). 
354 ―The Congress shall have Power to lay and collect  Taxes, Duties, 
Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common 
Defence and general Welfare of the  United States; . . .‖ US Const Art I, 
§ 8, cl 1. 
355 See 20 USC 1101 § 493(a)(24). 
356 See Quest Bridge, online at http://www.questbridge.org/ (visited Feb 
7, 2014). 
357 See  Poss  e  Is  Not   a  Program.  It‘ s  a  Movement  (Posse 
Foundation), online at http://www.possefoundation.org/our-
university-partners/ (visited Feb 7, 2014). 
358 On fees, see Lingbo Li, Overlooking Questbridge Applicants (Harvard 
Crimson Oct 15, 2008), online at 
http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2008/10/15/overlooking-questbridge- 
applicants-merema-m-ahmed/ (visited Feb 7, 2014). On early decision 65 
 
 
 
My suggestion is at once more ambitious and potentially more 
edifying: universities can create pipelines of their own. They can do so by 
committing significant institutional dollars to community-based 
collaborations with local organizations. These collaborations might be 
called  ―university-school-community‖ partnerships (USCs). 
 
Partners might and should include schools in neighborhoods 
where the target population of first-generation, poor students reside. One 
can imagine a university establishing a partnership with local middle 
schools or charter schools. A goal of such a partnership would be to 
ensure that students in partner schools are introduced to rigorous 
academic programs, study and time management skills, collegiate 
culture, and forms of social capital valued in higher education.359 
 
Universities that house schools of education are ideally situated to 
establish such partnerships. Preexisting expertise and interest in 
education theory and practice create the groundwork for successful 
endeavors. The  University of California, San  Diego‘s (UCSD) partnership 
with the Preuss School is a terrific example of the kind of socially 
transformative projects that universities can undertake.360 Preuss is a 
local charter middle and high school for low-income and highly motivated 
students who hope to be the first in their families to graduate from 
college.361 The school is situated on UCSD‘s campus and is operated by 
the university. Chartered by the local school district, Preuss is supported 
by private funds.362 The culturally and racially diverse students who 
attend Preuss have achieved tremendous academic success in recent 
 
 
deadlines and constraints imposed on choices, see National College 
Match Flowchart (Quest Bridge), online at 
http://www.questbridge.org/for-students/ncm-flowchart (visited Feb 7, 
2014) (requiring ranking of college choices by early November and 
commitment by early December if chosen); Quick Facts (Posse 
Foundation), online at http://www.possefoundation.org/quick- 
facts#whopaysfor (visited Feb 7, 2014) (noting that it is an early decision 
program). 
359 See Lareau, Unequal Childhoods at 7 (cited in note 199); Stuber, 
Inside the College Gates at 15 (cited in note); Omari Scott Simmons, Lost 
in Transition: The Implications of Social Capital for Higher Education 
Access, 87 Notre Dame L Rev 205, 206 (2011) (arguing the need to focus 
on social capital deficits in access to higher education programs). 
360 See Preuss School, online at http://preuss.ucsd.edu (visited Feb 7, 
2014). 
361 See id. 
362 The Preuss School at a Glance (The Preuss School), online at 
http://preuss.ucsd.edu/about-preuss/preuss-at-a-glance.html (visited Feb 
7, 2014). 66 
 
 
years, measured in terms of college acceptance and matriculation 
rates.363 The key to success has been intervention in students‘ lives  along 
all of the critical dimensions discussed above that so deeply influence 
whether potential is nurtured and matures. 
 
If several other universities established USCs that included rigorous 
college preparatory schools, social supports, and exposure to college that 
talented first-generation students need, the result could be socially 
transformative. 
After first-generation students matriculate to college, 
institutional initiatives are necessary to create a welcoming and 
supportive campus environment. Just as universities offer campus 
centers and special services to support other students, they can make 
services available to these students to ease the transition to college life. 
The creation of institutional spaces for these purposes and the provision 
of financial support for programs that provide mentoring, encourage 
social engagement, teach effective study skills, and offer academic 
support are vital.364 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Instead of representing a slide toward retrenchment on equal 
opportunity, the changing legal environment for race-conscious 
affirmative action can herald a new era of opportunity for students in all 
of America‘s forgotten communities. Selective universities can play a 
significant role in this new environment. These universities are 
recipients of significant amounts of federal funding,365 and as such, are 
obligated to contribute to the nation-state and to their surrounding 
communities for collective good. 
 
Already universities make invaluable contributions through 
faculty research and student service projects. Whole universities, such as 
Stanford in California and MIT in Cambridge, are well known for the 
 
 
 
 
363 See Preussline 1 (UC San Diego Fall 2013), online at 
http://preuss.ucsd.edu/about-preuss/preuss-at-a-glance.html (visited Feb 
7, 2014). 
364 See Engle and Tinto, Moving Beyond Access at 27–29 (cited in note 
260). 
365 The federal government provides universities with about $30 billion 
annually in research and development funding alone. See Nick 
Anderson, Sequester Cuts University Research Funds (Wash. Post. Mar 
16, 2013), online at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/sequester-cuts- 
university-research-funds/2013/03/16/08e9cc24-877a-11e2-9d71- 
f0feafdd1394_story.html (visited Feb 7, 2014). 67 
 
 
value they added to their communities through entrepreneurship.366 
Faculty and students at these universities have created products, 
applications, and other inventions that have generated tremendous 
wealth, both  for individuals and for the  nation‘s economy. 
 
In this anniversary year of the Civil Rights Act, I propose that 
universities can make a different kind of contribution to the nation-state, 
local communities, and ultimately, the citizenry. Universities can engage 
in social entrepreneurship. Institutions of higher education are ideally 
situated to promote social mobility by expanding efforts to recruit first- 
generation, truly impoverished students. 
 
A concerted effort to raise up first-generation college students can 
address the social and economic stagnation that Americans fear, and 
tackle inequality of opportunity. The resolve to ensure the welfare of 
these students is a part of the unfinished agenda of the freedom struggle 
that President Johnson so eloquently endorsed in 1965. Tangible 
commitment to disadvantaged students—through dollars, cents, visions, 
institutional plans, and partnerships—would have the virtue of more 
profoundly engaging structural inequality. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
366 See John Hennessy, Doing Well by Doing Good: Non-profit Start-ups 
Harness Energy and Idealism to Make Positive Change, President‘s 
Column (Stanford Alumni Magazine Sept/Oct 2013), online at 
http://alumni.stanford.edu/get/page/magazine/article/?article_id=64324 
(visited Feb 7, 2014); Venture Mentoring Service Wins Award: MIT 
Program Harnesses Knowledge and Experience of Volunteer Alumni and 
Business Leaders to Help Prospective Entrepreneurs (MIT News Apr 26, 
2010), online at http://web.mit.edu/newsoffice/2010/vms-award.html 
(visited Feb 7, 2014). 68 
 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 
2010 DISTRIBUTION OF MEAN SAT SCORE BY PARENT INCOME AND 
EDUCATION LEVEL 
 
 
 
 
Test- 
takers 
 
 
 
 
(%) 
Critic 
al 
Readi 
ng 
 
 
 
 
Math 
 
 
 
Writin 
g 
Family Income 
$0-$20,000  109,651  11  437  460  432 
$20,000-$40,000  150,390  16  465  479  455 
40,000- $60,000  141,307  15  490  500  478 
$60,000 - $80,000  135,872  14  504  514  492 
 
 
$80,000-$100,000  119,051  12  518  529  505 
$100,000-$120,000  100,383  10  528  541  518 
$120,000-$140,000  51,194  5  533  546  523 
$140,000-$160,000  38,997  4  540  554  531 
$160,000-$200,000  45,567  5  547  561  540 
More than $200,000  69,907  7  568  586  567 
 
Education Level 
No H.S Diploma 
 
 
73865 
 
 
5 
 
 
422 
 
 
446 
 
 
419 
H.S. Diploma  427004  31  464  475  453 
Associate Degree  119817  9  482  491  469 
Bachelor's Degree  415900  30  521  536  512 
Graduate Degree  358717  26  561  575  554 
 
Total mean SAT Score:  501  516  492 69 
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First-Generation Freshmen Enrollment as Compared to 
Under Represented Minorities, Class of 2017 
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Under Represented Minority: any student belonging to one or more of the 
follow categories: African American, Native-American, Hispanic/Latino 
and Multiracial. 70 
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Average First-Generation Freshmen Enrollment as 
Compared to Under Represented Minorities, Class of 
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